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 This thesis looks to reframe the timeline of the First Red Scare in United States History. 
Historians of this period have consistently viewed the First Red Scare as occurring from 1919 to 
1920. However, by viewing the First Red Scare as beginning in 1919, historians missed the fear 
of communism that developed in the US government and the American press and society 
throughout 1917 and 1918, starting immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution. Moreover, in 
the past, historians have done little to detail the connections between the Allied Intervention in 
Russia from 1918 to 1920 and the First Red Scare, despite that these events happened at the same 
time. Using the reframed timeline of 1917 to 1920, this work looks at US participation in the 
Allied Intervention in Russia as part of the First Red Scare. Furthermore, this study views 1919 
as a year in which American fears of communist activity in the US escalated, as opposed to the 
year in which those anxieties began.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Historiography 
Historians often describe the First Red Scare as a time when fear of Communism 
swept throughout the United States, causing intense hysteria and panic to consume 
American society. Historians have consistently framed the First Red Scare as occurring 
from 1919 to 1920, as during these years the press and government officials alleged that 
the Bolsheviks lurked behind mass labor protests, bomb plots, and leftist groups across 
the US. However, upon inspection, the timeline of 1919 to 1920 is problematic for 
numerous reasons. By claiming that American hysteria over Bolshevism began in 1919, 
historians have ignored the initial fears Americans held concerning leftists and Bolshevik 
uprisings in the US that began shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917 
and carried on throughout 1918. During these earlier years, the American press stirred 
anxieties about Bolshevik plots in the country and the US government persecuted alleged 
Bolshevik conspirators.  In truth, American panic about Bolshevik activity in the US 
began in late 1917 and did not begin to decrease until 1920. Moreover, by viewing the 
First Red Scare as occurring from 1917 to 1920, historians can incorporate important 
factors into the era that have often been isolated from it. These include American 
reactions to the rise of Bolshevism in Russia throughout 1917 and 1918 and US 
participation in the Allied Intervention in Russia from 1918 to 1920. By adding these 
elements, it becomes apparent that the First Red Scare emerged out of the events of 
World War I, as Americans came to think of the Bolsheviks as German agents and thus 
enemies of war. As the First Red Scare occurred throughout the US, Americans 
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constantly read in newspapers stories of both Bolshevik terror and treachery abroad, as 
well as stories of US and Allied troops fighting the Bolsheviks in Russia. Articles like 
these surely added to American hatred of Bolshevism. 
As of now, there is little connection between the historiographical fields of World 
War I American home-front counter-subversivism and the Allied Intervention in Russia 
with that of the First Red Scare. Historians of American counter-subversivism during 
World War I have written numerous works focused on the persecution of Industrial 
Workers of the World members, socialists, women, and African Americans endured from 
the US government for being suspected German agents. While most of the works within 
this field do usually mention the First Red Scare briefly, the era is considered by 
historians to be separate from World War I as historians see counter-subversive measures 
to be focused on German agents and First Red Scare measures to target Bolshevik 
radicals. Scholars have overlooked the Bolshevik hysteria that occurred in America 
during World War I, and thus do not strongly connect the issue of World War I counter-
subversivism in the US with the First Red Scare. Additionally, historians of US 
participation in the Allied Intervention in Russia from 1918 to 1920 have not tied the 
First Red Scare to the intervention, despite these events occurring at the same time. Most 
debate Woodrow Wilson’s motives in leading the US to participate in the intervention, or 
they are concerned with the intervention itself. Historians of American participation in 
the intervention have not focused on how the Bolsheviks or the intervention was depicted 
to Americans at home, but these important factors help better explain what fueled the 
hysteria of the First Red Scare. 
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While historians of the First Red Scare have written great histories of the period, 
they mostly have not attempted to connect their works to World War I counter-
subversivism. Historians have come to a consensus that the First Red Scare began in 
early 1919, but they have largely ignored in their works the persecution leftists faced for 
being alleged Bolshevik conspirators during 1917 and 1918. Moreover, First Red Scare 
historians isolate the First Red Scare from the Allied Intervention in Russia, despite that 
stories of American troops fighting Bolsheviks were common in newspapers through 
1918 to 1920. While labor unrest, bomb plots, and raids provided significant agitation for 
the fear of the era, the intervention did as well by essentially making the Bolsheviks 
wartime enemies. Overall, by studying World War I counter-subversivism, the First Red 
Scare, and the Allied Intervention in Russia as interconnected events that occurred 
between 1917 to 1920, historians can research more in depth the ways in which World 
War I influenced and created the First Red Scare and American perceptions of 
Communism in the decades that followed.  
 Most of the historiography on counter-subversivism on the American home front 
during World War I is focused on the anti-radical methods utilized by the United States 
government. In 1979, Paul L. Murphy researched the impact of the federal government’s 
counter-subversive methods on Americans’ civil liberties in his book World War I and 
the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States. Murphy argued that the federal 
government developed a national policy of counter-subversion to suppress dissent and 
force Americans to support the country’s war effort.1 Murphy claimed that prior to 
America’s entrance into World War I, state government and the private sector punished 
                                                          
1 Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: 
Norton & Company, 1979), 10.  
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dissent, but once the US joined the war, the federal government took over this 
responsibility.2 According to Murphy, to suppress the IWW, the Socialist Party of 
America and other suspected anti-American radicals, the federal government developed a 
policy to fight dissent. It built this policy on laws such as the Espionage Act of 1917, the 
Sedition Act of 1918, and the Immigration Act of 1918.3 Murphy further pointed out that 
the federal government created a network to suppress these groups by using both the 
Justice Department to arrest suspected radicals and the Postal Service to ban these 
individuals and groups from sending mail.4  
Although Murphy did mention that Americans considered Bolsheviks a threat in 
1918, his book is focused on how the US government suppressed groups suspected of 
being pro-German agents during World War I.5 Murphy dedicated about a page of his 
work to the First Red Scare, which he believed began after the war.6 The author saw 
World War I and the First Red Scare as separate events, but believed they shared a 
connection because national leaders intended to maintain the system of wartime 
repression in the years after the war.7 Overall, Murphy’s analysis did explore suppression 
of dissent in American society during the World War I. However, the connections he 
made between the war and the First Red Scare, as well as his lack of information about 
how the government handled suspected Bolshevik agents during the war, left room for 
further research.  
                                                          
2 Murphy, World War I, 51-52. 
3 Murphy, World War I, 79, 82, 85. 
4 Murphy, World War I, 92-95, 98-101. 
5 Murphy, World War I, 133.  
6 Murphy, World War I, 85. 
7 Murphy, World War I, 177-178, 270. 
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 Like Murphy, in 2008, William Thomas Jr. studied the federal government’s 
campaign to suppress dissent during World War I in Unsafe for Democracy: World War I 
and the U.S. Department’s Covert Campaign to Suppress Dissent, but Thomas chose to 
look specifically at the role of the Justice Department during this period. He argued that 
the Justice Department used intimidation methods such as threats, interrogation, and 
warnings to curtail dissent and sedition.8 Thomas wrote about multiple groups that the 
Justice Department regularly targeted as pro-German subversives, such as women, 
African Americans, German Americans, clergy, pacifists, and leftists such as socialists 
and IWW members.9 The focuses of Unsafe for Democracy made it a special addition to 
the historiography on American counter-subversivism during World War I, as prior to 
this book, historians had not given the Justice Department’s use of intimidation as a form 
of suppression much attention.10  
Additionally, Thomas mentioned the First Red Scare in his book, stating that the 
counter-subversive policies established during the war period helped to create the Red 
Scare.11 He also briefly explained that Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer later 
continued to use the Justice Department to suppress and intimidate suspected enemy 
agents in 1919 and 1920.12 Due to Thomas’ analysis, it is clear he saw connections 
between World War I and First Red Scare periods based on suppression of suspected 
subversives. However, Thomas did not explore the American government’s persecution 
of those accused of being Bolshevik supporters during 1917 and 1918. Additional 
                                                          
8 William H. Thomas Jr., Unsafe for Democracy: World War I and the U.S. Justice Department’s 
Covert Campaign to Suppress Dissent (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 3-5. 
9 Thomas, Unsafe for Democracy, 4. 
10 Thomas, Unsafe for Democracy, 3-5. 
11 Thomas, Unsafe for Democracy, 6. 
12 Thomas, Unsafe for Democracy, 175. 
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research would show that the government viewed groups such as the IWW and the 
Socialist Party of America as both German and Bolshevik agents during most of 
America’s participation in World War I.  
Taking a new approach to the study of American anti-radicalism during World 
War I, in 2010, Steven C. Levi focused on how it was implemented in Alaska in The 
Great Red Scare in World War One Alaska: Elite Panic, Government Hysteria, 
Suppression of Civil Liberties, Union-breaking, and Germanophobia, 1915-1920. He 
argued that hysteria and counter-subversivism in Alaska represented the fear and 
suppression of dissent throughout the US.13 While the title of Levi’s book made it seem 
as if it would be a study of World War I and the First Red Scare in Alaska together, he 
only briefly discussed the period of 1919 to 1920, making the book almost entirely a 
study of counter-subversivism against alleged German agents during the war.14 Still, his 
title and analysis suggested the continuation between World War I anti-radicalism and the 
First Red Scare was so strong, these two periods needed to be considered as one instead. 
While he did not effectively study the First Red Scare in depth, Levi’s concept overall 
supports the idea that these two periods need to be researched together as part of a greater 
continuum.  
Since Levi primarily focused on World War I in his book, he wrote more on 
Alaskans’ fears of German agents infiltrating their society. Levi claimed that Alaskans 
became suspicious of German sympathizers when the US entered the war and increased 
                                                          
13 Steven C. Levi, The Great Red Scare in World War One Alaska: Elite Panic, Government 
Hysteria, Suppression of Civil Liberties, Union-breaking, and Germanophobia, 1915-1920 (Palo Alto: 
Academia Press, 2010), x-xi. 
14 Levi, The Great Red Scare, 157, 160-161. 
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its military presence in the territory.15 In order to counter German agents and suppress 
dissent, councils of defense developed in communities across Alaska with the intent of 
seeking out and stopping subversive plots.16 Alaskans viewed IWW members and draft 
dodgers as German sympathizers and promoted 100 percent Americanism as well.17 
Looking at the First Red Scare, Levi supported the idea that the First Red Scare began in 
1919 and wrote that after the war ended, Alaskans also became hysteric over the 
possibility of a Bolshevik coup.18  While Levi’s book does lend credence to the idea of 
studying the World War I and First Red Scare periods together, his work leaves readers 
wondering if Alaskans feared a Bolshevik uprising earlier than 1919. 
In 2014, Eric Thomas Chester released a study on the impact American counter-
subversive methods made on the IWW during World War I in The Wobblies in Their 
Heyday: The Rise and Destruction of the Industrial Workers of the World during the 
World War I Era. Chester argued that the US government targeted the IWW as un-
American and attempted to destroy the union, due to the labor demonstrations and 
protests the IWW organized in important wartime industries such as lumber and mining. 
Moreover, he claimed that the federal government, and specifically the Justice 
Department, violated the civil liberties of IWW members.19 The Wobblies in Their 
Heyday is an interesting and useful book, as Chester’s research emphasized the 
                                                          
15 Levi, The Great Red Scare, 38-40. 
16 Levi, The Great Red Scare, 40. 
17 Levi, The Great Red Scare, 70, 108-109. 
18 Levi, The Great Red Scare, 176, 186. 
19 Eric Thomas Chester, The Wobblies in Their Heyday: The Rise and Destruction of the Industrial 
Workers of the World during the World War I Era (Amherst: Levellers Press, 2014), xii-xiii. 
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perspective of a group suspected of anti-American sentiment and targeted by the 
government’s campaign to suppress dissent. 
 Even though the IWW did not take an official stance against the war effort, 
Chester showed that the federal government accused IWW members of being German 
agents.20 Moreover, the Justice Department raided IWW headquarters and meeting places 
around the country beginning in 1917, and its agents arrested hundreds of IWW 
members. In a raid on the IWW headquarters in Chicago, the Justice Department arrested 
IWW leader Big Bill Haywood and over 90 other members, who the courts charged with 
sedition and gave long prison sentences.21 Chester claimed that, while the IWW did 
survive persecution during and after the war, the numerous raids, arrests, and jail 
sentences severely weakened the IWW.22 Regarding the First Red Scare, Chester did 
make several connections between it and the wartime persecution of the IWW. He 
showed that the IWW praised the Bolshevik revolution for being the most successful 
socialist revolution in history, but that the rise of Communist parties in the US ended up 
hurting the IWW because these parties absorbed 5,000 of the union’s members.23 He also 
differentiated the approaches the Justice Department used to combat the IWW during 
these two periods, stating that the Justice Department stopped arresting IWW members 
under the Espionage and Sedition acts when the war ended.24 While Chester in some 
ways tied together the World War I period and the First Red Scare, he did not answer 
how early the IWW faced persecution for being Bolshevik sympathizers. 
                                                          
20 Chester, The Wobblies, 117-120, 136. 
21 Chester, The Wobblies, 150-151, 186-187. 
22 Chester, The Wobblies, 202, 210. 
23 Chester, The Wobblies, 110, 204-206. 
24 Chester, The Wobblies, 203. 
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Shifting focus to First Red Scare historiography, in 1955, Robert K. Murray 
released Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920. The author claimed Red 
Scare to be the first time a historian covered the entire history of the First Red Scare 
period in a book. While Murray stated that he did not argue a thesis in Red Scare, the 
book became an authoritative account on the First Red Scare years and is still one of the 
best histories of the era today.25 Red Scare is an in depth analysis, based on Murray’s use 
of newspapers, government documents, and radical literature to detail the events of the 
period, including strikes, the bombing of A. Mitchell Palmer’s house, and the Palmer 
raids.26  
While Murray’s writing focused on the First Red Scare, the author did limited 
exploration of the influence of World War I on the hysteric years following the war. 
Murray claimed that Americans were first introduced to Bolshevism during the October 
Revolution and that the Bolsheviks enraged Americans when they pulled Russia from the 
war with the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and allowed the eastern front to collapse. In 
some cases, following the October Revolution, some Americans even thought the 
Bolsheviks were German agents.27 The author also discussed American intervention in 
Russia during 1918, stating that since a vast majority of Americans believed the 
Bolshevik government to be tied to the Germans, it confused and scared them when the 
Bolshevik government outlasted Germany’s defeat.28 While Murray did make 
connections between the First Red Scare and the events of World War I, he only 
                                                          
25 Robert K. Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920 (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1964), x. 
26 Murray, Red Scare, 61, 78, 210-213, 220, 282-288. 
27 Murray, Red Scare, 33-34.  
28 Murray, Red Scare, 40-42. 
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mentioned them in passing without providing much analysis. Also, Murray did not 
explore persecution alleged Bolshevik conspirators faced in America in 1917 or 1918, 
since he believed that the First Red Scare occurred between 1919 and 1920. 
In 1972, another First Red Scare historian, Julian Jaffe, released Crusade Against 
Radicalism: New York during the First Red Scare, 1914-1924. Jaffe focused on the First 
Red Scare in New York, as opposed to doing a national study of the event. He wanted to 
compare the First Red Scare in New York to the rest of the country, and he concluded 
that, while the First Red Scare ended in 1920 for most of the country, it did not end in 
New York until 1924, due to the significant immigrant populations and strong leftist 
presence throughout the state.29 Whereas Murray focused his writing and research on 
1919 to 1920, Jaffe covered the years 1914 to 1924, allowing him to better describe the 
differences among and the history of leftists groups in New York such as the Socialist 
Party, the IWW, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and the International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union.30 Like Murray, however, Jaffe argued that the First Red Scare 
began in 1919.31 However, he saw it was necessary to cover the war years, as Jaffe 
believed that the counter-subversivism against leftists during that time helped create the 
First Red Scare.32 Writing on the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, the author 
also claimed that it helped create the hysteria of 1919 because Americans saw the 
Bolsheviks as opposite of American ideals.33 Yet, while he did discuss these topics in his 
                                                          
29 Julian F. Jaffe, Crusade against Radicalism: New York during the First Red Scare, 1914-1924 
(New York: Kennikat Press, 1972), 7, 238. 
30 Jaffe, Crusade against Radicalism, 10-13, 25-35. 
31 Jaffe, Crusade against Radicalism, 77-79. 
32 Jaffe, Crusade against Radicalism, 74-75. 
33 Jaffe, Crusade against Radicalism, 77-80. 
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book, Jaffe did not cover the persecution leftists faced in 1917 or 1918 for being 
suspected Bolshevik agents. 
Jaffe went on throughout the rest of the book to give a highly interesting and 
detailed account of the First Red Scare in New York. He wrote about the Lusk 
Committee’s raids in New York on the Russian Bureau, the Rand School, Socialist Party 
headquarters, and Communist Party meeting places.34 He also detailed an event that 
occurred in 1920 when the New York State Legislature barred five socialists from taking 
office.35 The author concluded that by 1924 in New York, the state government finally 
stopped prosecuting in the First Red Scare as fewer immigrants entered the state.36 Jaffe’s 
book is intriguing since it focused on an individual state, and the historiography of the 
First Red Scare could benefit from more such studies that show how long the hysteria of 
the Scare lasted in different places in the US.  
In 1998, Theodore Kornweibel Jr. departed from other First Red Scare historians 
when he explored the period from the viewpoint of African Americans in his book 
“Seeing Red”: Federal Campaigns against Black Militancy, 1919-1925. He argued that 
during this time, Americans came to suspect African Americans of being radicals and 
vulnerable to Communist influence.37 Kornweibel’s focus on African Americans and 
their experience during the First Red Scare both added to and challenged the 
historiography on the period, as Murray only mentioned the role of African Americans in 
the First Red Scare in passing in Red Scare and Jaffe did not feel that African Americans 
                                                          
34 Jaffe, Crusade against Radicalism, 119-124, 126-132. 
35 Jaffe, Crusade against Radicalism, 145-146. 
36 Jaffe, Crusade against Radicalism, 227-236. 
37 Theodore Kornweibel Jr., “Seeing Red”: Federal Campaigns against Black Militancy, 1919-
1925 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).  
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held a prominent role in the event.38 Thus, “Seeing Red” is a groundbreaking work and 
additionally, it is well researched. 
In offering background for his topic, Kornweibel briefly explored the World War 
I period, noting that organizations such as the Military Intelligence Division, the Bureau 
of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Post Office Department 
assigned to combat subversives during World War I continued their offensive into the 
First Red Scare.39 Focusing on the First Red Scare, the author wrote that the authorities 
often accused African Americans of being IWW members, socialists, Bolsheviks, or 
anarchists for merely agreeing with individual unorthodox political theories. Moreover, 
the agencies investigating Bolshevism in the US often categorized cases of black 
militancy in 1919 as Bolshevik activity.40 Furthermore, federal authorities came to 
believe that the NAACP held connections with Bolsheviks and they feared Marcus 
Garvey was a Bolshevik revolutionary.41 Authorities also worried that the IWW held 
major influence in the black community and was radicalizing African Americans with 
Bolshevik ideology.42 While “Seeing Red” stands as an excellent and original study of 
the First Red Scare, it would be great to see this study expanded upon to show how early 
African Americans faced suspicions of being Bolshevik agents. By beginning the book in 
1917, Kornweibel would have been able to show a continuation of blacks being targeted 
as subversives during both World War I and the First Red Scare. Moreover, these 
connections would allow historians to track how intelligence agencies investigated the 
                                                          
38 Murray, Red Scare, 101-102; Jaffe, Crusade against Radicalism, 95. 
39 Kornweibel, “Seeing Red,” 1, 7-16.  
40 Kornweibel, “Seeing Red,” 20-22.  
41 Kornweibel, “Seeing Red,” 70, 131. 
42 Kornweibel, “Seeing Red, 155-170. 
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African American community over time, and if these agencies differentiated their 
methods during the war and postwar periods. 
Erica J. Ryan also contributed a significant work to the First Red Scare 
historiography in 2015 with Red War on the Family: Sex, Gender and Americanism in the 
First Red Scare. In her book, Ryan studied how Americanism during the First Red Scare 
influenced and shaped gender and family roles in American society. She concluded that 
the prevalence of Americanism during this period helped bolster and solidify 
heterosexuality and patriarchy in the years that followed.43 Not only did her book help 
flesh out the ways in which the First Red Scare shaped American life outside of labor and 
the government by demonstrating how it affected American families, but Ryan also 
developed a strong study of how most Americans perceived the concepts of Americanism 
and Bolshevism during 1919 to the early 1920s.44 Red War on the Family is not only a 
welcome addition to the scholarship on the First Red Scare, but it also is a useful book for 
researching the early adversarial relationship between the US and Soviet Russia. 
Similar to Murray, Ryan blamed the inflation and unemployment from the end of 
the war for helping cause the First Red Scare.45 She also argued that 100 percent 
Americanism developed during the war years, and its advocates used it to help define the 
postwar period.46 During the First Red Scare, Ryan claimed that Americanism solidified 
the notion that Americans needed to be a part of a patriarchal family. Moreover, 
Americanism shaped dominant norms, as it prescribed men as the breadwinner of the 
                                                          
43 Erica J. Ryan, Red War on the Family: Sex, Gender, and Americanism in the First Red Scare 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2015), 15. 
44 Ryan, Red War on the Family, 25. 
45 Ryan, Red War on the Family, 21-22. 
46 Ryan, Red War on the Family, 30-32,39, 113-114. 
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family and women as homemakers.47 According to this ideal, feminism was rejected 
during the First Red Scare, and people accused feminist activists of being Bolshevik 
sympathizers. A stereotype of feminists even developed during this time, and these 
women were often portrayed as Bolshevik radicals who could only be tamed through 
marriage and having a family.48 Americans expected women to instill patriotic values in 
their children as well.49 Even though Ryan’s Red War on the Family is an informative 
account of the war’s and Red Scare’s impact on gender roles during the First Red Scare, 
her work also could be expanded. While she did focus on the rise of Americanism during 
World War I, she did little to elaborate on the experiences of women living in the US 
during wartime. As Thomas showed in Unsafe for Democracy, women faced many of the 
same problems and accusations during the war as they did in the First Red Scare.50 Thus, 
there is room in the historiography for a work on American women and their experiences 
with anti-radicalism from 1917 to 1920. This study would provide an interesting 
comparison of the roles of women during the war and the First Red Scare and define 
radical behavior in both periods. Moreover, such a study could demonstrate how quickly 
after the Bolshevik Revolution American society and the government became worried 
that women might be susceptible to the Bolsheviks. 
Turning to works on the Allied Intervention and looking at the participation of the 
US specifically, historians have debated in depth the motivations and goals of President 
Woodrow Wilson and the US government in the intervention or they have written about 
the intervention itself. Some historians like Betty Miller Unterberger, George F. Kennan, 
                                                          
47 Ryan, Red War on the Family, 44, 100-104. 
48 Ryan, Red War on the Family, 139-141, 67-78. 
49 Ryan, Red War on the Family, 116-117. 
50 Thomas, Unsafe for Democracy, 50. 
15 
 
and George C. Guins, among others, claimed Wilson did not aim to interfere with the 
self-determination of the Russian people. Instead, these historians assert Wilson 
participated in the intervention to save the Czech Legion and to stop Japan should it try to 
colonize Siberia.51 Arthur S. Link also argued that Wilson sent soldiers to Russia to aid in 
the evacuation of the Czech Legion, “keep an eye” on Japanese military actions in 
Siberia, and protect Allied military supplies in Russian ports from German forces.52 
According to Link, Wilson was “the one person who prevented large-scale military 
intervention in Russia.”53 
Other historians such as Robert J. Maddox and David S. Foglesong disagreed, 
arguing that Wilson wanted to overthrow or harm the Bolshevik regime.54 Likewise, 
Robert H. Wiebe claimed that Wilson worried over “the military implications of 
Bolshevikism,” and that he “drifted rather easily into a support of the 
counterrevolutionaries whom Britain and France were sponsoring” against the 
Bolsheviks.55 John Lewis Gaddis argued that Wilson’s opposition to the Bolsheviks 
ended up having long lasting effects on the US, as Gaddis claimed that Wilson’s “ill-
conceived and half-hearted military intervention against the Bolsheviks” was one factor 
                                                          
51 Betty Miller Unterberger, “President Wilson and the Decision to Send Troops to Siberia,” 
Pacific Historical Review no. 1 (Feb. 1955): 63-74, accessed May 6, 2018, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3635232, 71-72, 74; George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: 
Decision to Intervene vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 397-399; George C. Guins, “The 
Siberian Intervention, 1918-1919,” The Russian Review no. 4 (Oct. 1969): 428-440, accessed May 6, 2018, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/127162, 433-434; 51 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. 
Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 414-415. 
52 Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1979), 96-97. 
53 Link, Woodrow Wilson, 97. 
54 Robert J. Maddox, The Unknown War with Russia: Wilson’s Siberian Intervention (San Rafael: 
Presidio Press, 1977), 6-7; David S. Foglesong, America’s Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. 
Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920, 2nd ed (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001), 5-9. 
55 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 276.  
16 
 
that inspired Americans to return to isolationism following World War I.56 While 
historians have held significant debate over American motivations in the Allied 
intervention, there is little study done on the American home front in regards to US 
involvement in the intervention despite that while the intervention occurred from 1918 to 
1920, Americans at home feared Bolshevik activity within the US from 1917 to 1920. 
Press coverage of US relations with Russia and US involvement in the intervention 
during these years portrayed the Bolsheviks as wartime enemies and German agents to 
the American people, giving the public further reason to fear suspected Bolshevik agents.  
 While previous attempts to study the First Red Scare, World War I counter-
subversivism on the American home front, and US participation in the Allied intervention 
have been informative and well done, these are fields that should be viewed as being 
more connected. By expanding the currently accepted First Red Scare timeline of 1919 to 
1920 to include American anxieties over possible Bolshevik agents in the US during 
1917 and 1918, historians can see that the First Red Scare did not just follow World War 
I but emerged during it. Likewise, the expanded timeline of 1917 to 1920 allows 
historians to better tie the First Red Scare with the Allied Intervention in Russia to study 
how the intervention influenced American fear of Bolsheviks at home. The chapters that 
follow will more demonstrate the benefits of studying the First Red Scare using an 
expanded timeline of 1917 to 1920. Chapter 2, dedicated to American relations with 
Russia from 1917 to 1918, shows that actions taken by the US government and press 
defined and helped create the Bolsheviks as enemies of the US to the American people. 
                                                          




Chapter 3 focuses on America’s fear of Bolshevik agents within the US from November 
1917 to December 1918. Moreover, it argues that November 1917 should be considered 
the start of the First Red Scare. Chapter 4 examines the First Red Scare from 1919 to 
1920. In this chapter, 1919 is viewed as an escalation in First Red Scare hysteria, as 
opposed to the year that it began. Additionally, this chapter includes press coverage of 
US participation in the Allied intervention and argues that this press coverage helped fuel 




Chapter 2:  To Create an Enemy: American Reactions to the Bolshevik Revolution, 
1917 to 1918 
 Before the First Red Scare and American fear of Bolshevism developed as reactions 
to the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, the administration under President 
Woodrow Wilson and the American press celebrated the Provisional Government that 
became Russia’s governing body following the abdication of Nicholas II. Additionally, the 
Wilson administration and the American press portrayed the Provisional Government as a 
new democracy and as a valuable ally in the fight against autocracy to the American people. 
However, the press and government offered this praise without taking into consideration 
the threat the Petrograd Soviet and the Bolsheviks posed to the Provisional Government’s 
stability and ability to govern Russia. Thus, due to the government and press’ validation of 
the Provisional Government, when the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in November 
1917, it seemed that the Bolsheviks had destroyed a healthy democracy to the American 
people. Throughout 1917 and 1918, both the Wilson administration and press continued to 
worsen American perceptions of Bolsheviks. The US government intervened in the 
Russian civil war in 1918 and portrayed Bolshevik leaders as German agents. Likewise, 
the press depicted the Bolsheviks as German conspirators and bringers of chaos. Overall, 
the actions of both the Wilson administration and American press aided in causing the 
American public to view the Bolsheviks as a great threat to American life. These factors 




With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the Triple Entente hoped to divide and 
overwhelm the armies of the Central Powers by forcing them to fight a two-front war in 
which Britain and France planned to apply pressure from Western Europe, while Russia 
intended to push from Eastern Europe.57 However, as the war raged, Russia lost ground to 
the German military and suffered shortages of food and fuel at home.58 These conditions 
caused disaffection to spread among the Russian people, as they saw Russia’s war against 
the Central Powers as the “Tsar’s War.”59 By March 15, 1917, this unrest led to revolution 
that caused the dissolution of Russia’s monarchy.60 After the collapse of the monarchy, 
Petrograd’s politicians established a Provisional Government.61 This transitional form of 
government defined itself as democratic and liberal, as it supported free speech and it 
promised to allow the Russian people to elect a constituent assembly purposed to establish 
a new government.62  
However, almost immediately, the Provisional Government faced antagonism from 
the Petrograd Soviet, another governing body, made up of Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and 
Socialist Revolutionaries among others, that also rose to power after the collapse of the 
tsarist regime.63 These socialist groups held heavy influence over both Russia’s workforce 
and military, giving the Petrograd Soviet domestic authority within Russia. Thus, the 
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Provisional Government could not act without the endorsement of the Petrograd Soviet.64 
However, the socialists lacked the knowledge and experience to govern a country, forcing 
them to rely on the Provisional Government to govern Russia.65 This dual power 
relationship became volatile as the two sides took opposing stances on Russia’s continued 
involvement in the war. The Provisional Government still planned to continue fighting, as 
it felt morally obligated to Britain and France to aid in defeating the Central Powers.66 Yet, 
the socialist parties did not want to stay in the war.67 This disagreement threatened both the 
Provisional Government’s stability and the country’s stamina to continue fighting the 
Central Powers.68   
As George F. Kennan argued, the US government formed its policy towards the 
Provisional Government almost completely oblivious to its dual power relationship with 
the Petrograd Soviet.69 The US ambassador in Petrograd, David R. Francis, felt excited 
about the abdication of the Tsar and the rise of the Provisional Government. He hated the 
tsarist regime, as he never managed to function well with it, due to the extreme differences 
between Russia’s autocratic system and the US government. Furthermore, he believed that 
the Russian people wanted to get rid of the Tsar in favor of political freedom.70 Francis 
also saw the Provisional Government as a vessel purposed to disperse democratic and 
liberal ideas throughout the country.71 Without surveying the conditions of the country 
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more, the ambassador quickly established relations with the new Russian government and 
immediately began to press Washington DC to be the first to declare its recognition of the 
Provisional Government.72 
Along with Francis, US Secretary of State Robert Lansing pushed for the US to be 
the first to recognize the Provisional Government. In a letter to US President Woodrow 
Wilson, Lansing claimed that the Provisional Government built itself on “its hatred of 
absolutism” and that recognition from the US government “would encourage and 
strengthen the new democratic government in Russia.”73 At first, Wilson hesitated to 
declare Russia a democratic power.74 However, on March 22, Wilson made the US the first 
country to recognize Russia’s new government, based upon the advice of Francis and 
Lansing.75 France and Britain followed in their recognition of the Provisional Government 
shortly afterwards.76 This recognition helped to build a positive perception of Russia 
throughout America. Newspapers across the nation carried the news of the government’s 
recognition of the Provisional Government. The press told the American people of Russia’s 
newly established democratic principles and of the similar values between Russians and 
Americans.77 Wilson’s recognition of the Provisional Government and the American 
media’s coverage of his recognition helped to establish the Provisional Government as a 
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democracy in the minds of Americans, and not as a government struggling to sustain its 
existence. 
Additionally, with America’s entrance into World War I, the US government gave 
even more validation of the democratic values it saw in the Provisional Government. This 
can be observed in President Wilson’s address to Congress on April 2, 1917, in which he 
asked Congress to end US neutrality in the war, as Germany persisted in sinking American 
vessels and putting American lives at risk through its use of unrestricted submarine 
warfare.78 Wilson referenced Russia’s February Revolution directly when discussing his 
thoughts on autocratic and democratic systems, calling the abdication of the Tsar and the 
rise of the Provisional Government “wonderful and heartening.”79 Furthermore, Wilson 
stated that he believed that the transition of Russia’s government from autocratic to 
democratic governing would boost Russian morale and help the country turn the war in 
their favor.80 Wilson also proclaimed in his address that “Russia was known by those who 
knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart,” ignoring the reality that most 
Russians led lives of poverty and exclusion from channels of power.81 Yet, Russia’s 
recognition as a democratic power allowed President Wilson to make the war to be one of 
democratic governments against those of autocratic governments. Wilson felt autocracies 
lacked the ability to maintain peace in the world, and that only free people possessed the 
ability to further the interests of humanity. 82  
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Again, American newspapers provided national coverage to Wilson’s speech. To 
the American people, Wilson’s words further solidified Russia as a free country and 
valuable ally in the war against Germany.83 The New York Times published Wilson’s words 
that Russians now fought “for justice and for peace,” while the St. Louis Dispatch claimed 
that “the President had put a textbook of democracy into the hands of the oppressed 
throughout the world.”84 The Los Angeles Times referenced Russia’s emancipation of the 
serfs to exemplify the democratic spirit of Russia, and claimed that Russia’s latest 
“bloodless revolution” served as a step in helping bring world peace.85 Most importantly, 
news of President Wilson declaring the newly democratic Russia as a US ally excited many 
Americans, because for them these developments came as a national victory.86 However, 
Wilson’s words on Russia too quickly validated to the American people both Russian 
democracy and Russia’s ability to stay in the war.87 Moreover, just as Wilson at first felt 
hesitant to recognize Russia as a democracy, he privately expressed in the days that came 
after his speech that he did not feel certain about what might occur in Russia following the 
fall of the Tsar.88 Arguably, Wilson did not publicly express doubt concerning Russia’s 
future, as this would have jeopardized the argument that the war served as a fight between 
autocracy and democracy. 
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However, on November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks staged a coup, overthrowing the 
Provisional Government.89 Within hours of the start of the coup, the Bolsheviks achieved 
success, as the insurrection faced little resistance.90 In America, the press received 
information  of the Bolshevik usurpation of power before the US government and published 
news stories covering the event.91 The New York Times wrote that an illegal, revolutionary 
organization in Russia took over the state buildings.92 Furthermore, it wrote that the 
Provisional Government fell victim to the anarchy of the Bolsheviks, and that the success 
of the Bolsheviks only meant the worst for the Allied cause in Europe.93 The news 
organization also declared that the Bolsheviks planned to bring Russia back under the 
control of absolutism and the State Church. It lamented that the Bolsheviks spread their 
“red terror” through Russia, and not Germany instead.94 Moreover, the Chicago Tribune 
wrote that the Bolsheviks wanted to end the war by getting all countries to reject capitalism 
and to agree to “live happily ever after in a Socialist paradise.”95 The Oregon Daily Journal 
raised the suspicion that Germany stood behind the Bolshevik coup.96 Interestingly, the 
Wichita Daily Eagle exploited the revolt to connect the Socialist Party in America to the 
ideas of “the Russian Bolshevik,” “disloyalty,” and “German subserviency.”97  
These stories shocked the American public. Officials in Washington and the 
President had seemed optimistic about the Provisional Government.98 After all, Wilson 
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projected the Provisional Government to be a growing democracy and American ally, not 
a weak and unstable governing body.99 Moreover, prior to the coup of the Provisional 
Government, the Bolsheviks only played a small role in the American press. They appeared 
occasionally but went without being clearly defined to the American populace.100 Now, 
from what the American people could tell, this previously unknown group appeared as 
revolutionaries with the power to destroy democracy. Some Americans even came to think 
of the Bolsheviks as anarchists, while others viewed them as “agitators, fanatics, pacifists,” 
and “doctrinaire idealists.”101 Furthermore, through rumors spread by the press in the days 
following the Bolshevik takeover of Russia, it seemed that the Bolsheviks might be a 
puppet of the German government. This development created a sentiment of hostility and 
hatred towards not just the Bolsheviks, but Russia. This sentiment would also color 
American perceptions of Bolsheviks in the years to come, and cause fear of a similar 
uprising in the US to emerge within months of the October Revolution.  
Following the coup in Russia, official word that the Bolsheviks seized power did 
not reach Washington DC until November 10, leaving many in the US government unsure 
as to what actually had occurred.102 Francis wrote to Lansing informing him that Kerensky 
escaped Petrograd and requested that Wilson not recognize the new Bolshevik 
government.103 On November 12, President Wilson gave his first public reaction to the 
Bolshevik revolution. He stated that it amazed him that “any group of persons should be 
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so ill-informed” to believe that any interests of the Russian people could survive a Germany 
“powerful enough to undermine or overthrow them by intrigue or force” and that he found 
himself opposed to the stupidity of the “dreamers in Russia.”104 On November 13, Wilson 
received word that the Bolsheviks proposed an immediate end to hostilities between 
belligerent countries.105 The Bolsheviks issued this “Decree on Peace” the day after they 
assumed power in Russia.106 In this decree, the Bolsheviks declared that the war served as 
a way for capitalists to exploit the working class. Additionally, they called for all 
belligerent countries to negotiate peace as opposed to continuing to fight a war over the 
annexation of territory.107   
On November 20, the new Soviet government proposed an armistice to Germany. 
By November 28, the Germans agreed to accept a truce with the Russians. This agreement 
ceased hostilities between the two countries and signaled the start of the close of the Eastern 
Front, meaning Germany held the ability to now move its 147 units in the east to focus 
solely on the Western Front. The Allies now faced a problem they had worked to prevent 
throughout the war, and dashed any hopes that the Bolsheviks might continue to fight 
against Germany.108 Many Americans and others among the Allied countries felt betrayed 
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by Russia pulling its support from the war, as the country came to be known as the “Judas 
of nations” and “traitors” as well as “escaped murderers,” “hysterical,” and “criminal.”109  
  The press covered the armistice by putting forth sensational claims. Some papers 
said that German military advisers visited Petrograd, meaning soon the Bolsheviks would 
become an “active ally” of the Central Powers.110 The York Daily stated that “German staff 
advisers arrived in Petrograd to aid Bolsheviki in betrayal” and the Asheville Citizen-Times 
referred to Lenin as an agent of Berlin and the “prince of spies.”111 Other publications 
emphasized that German propaganda created the Bolsheviks and that the Bolsheviks were 
now making secretive negotiations with the Germans that put the Allies in danger.112 For 
many Americans, this perceived treachery colored their first impressions of Bolshevism 
and many felt the armistice might lead to military defeat at a crucial point in the war.113 
American sentiment towards Bolsheviks following the announcement of the armistice 
between Germany and Russia additionally demonstrated that anxiety about the Bolsheviks 
emerged as early as 1917. Fear of losing to Germany caused Americans to see the 
Bolsheviks as wartime enemies and negatively influenced American perceptions of the 
Bolsheviks and Russia. 
Additionally, Wilson refused to recognize the Soviet regime as Russia’s official 
governing. Instead he waited to see if the Bolsheviks possessed staying power, as he hoped 
that they might prove to be merely a short phase.114 Wilson’s administration also declined 
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to recognize the Bolsheviks because it claimed the Bolsheviks ruled through class 
despotism and did not represent the Russian people. Misguidedly optimistic, Wilson’s 
administration still felt that Russia possessed a democratic spirit and the administration 
held out hope that a stable democratic government might rise in Russia.115 However, by 
refusing to recognize the Bolsheviks, the Wilson administration only strained relations 
between the US and the new Russian government. This denial of recognition by the US 
significantly hurt the possibility of future cooperation with the Bolsheviks.116 Moreover, 
the armistice between Russia and Germany caused the US great stress, because it forced 
Wilson to attempt to send additional troops and supplies to France quicker in order to 
counter any new German offensive once Germany moved its troops from the east to the 
west.117  
On January 8, 1918, in response to the Bolshevik’s “Decree on Peace,” Wilson 
issued his “Fourteen Points Address” in the hopes that the speech might motivate the 
Bolsheviks to remain in the war.118 Wilson opened by discussing the peace negotiations 
between Russia and Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. The President described how the 
Central Powers offered no concessions to Russia in the peace talks, but instead demanded 
the eventual addition of occupied Russian lands to the territories of the Central Empires.119 
Moreover, Wilson claimed that for the Allies to succeed at creating a peaceful society, the 
Central Powers needed to be beaten. He argued that Russia and other countries around the 
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globe would not be able to determine their own governing institutions or be guaranteed 
safety so long as autocracies like the one that governed Germany remained.120 Thus, 
Wilson found Russia’s separate peace to be unacceptable. Wilson did not understand the 
goal of Bolshevik diplomacy, and he further denied that Russia did not possess the ability 
to continue fighting.121  
In spite of how much he disliked the negotiations between Germany and Russia, 
Wilson continued his address by claiming that the US still wanted to help the Russian 
people achieve liberty. At the end of the war, he planned to evacuate German troops from 
Russian territory and to give the Russian people an opportunity at independent 
determination. Overall, Wilson seemed hopeful that the Russians might oust the Bolshevik 
regime.122 The address outlined other goals Wilson hoped to accomplish by the end of the 
war. These aims included equal trading conditions for all nations, self-determination of all 
peoples, reduction in armaments globally, and the creation of an association of countries 
to help prevent armed conflict throughout the world.123 Through his “Fourteen Points 
Address,” Wilson aimed to create a liberal world based on American values, and he viewed 
the Bolsheviks as merely an obstacle to realizing this goal globally.124  
Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks held different designs for achieving peace than those 
Wilson proposed in the “Fourteen Points Address.” In March 1918, Russia signed the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, which effectively turned the armistice between the 
two countries into an official peace agreement. However, Russia lost over a quarter of both 
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its arable land and population as part of the deal.125 Once again, the press ran stories 
accusing Lenin of being an agent of Germany. The Chillicothe Constitution-Tribune 
claimed that Lenin was “playing into German hands” to “deliver the Russian government 
into Teuton control” and that Lenin advocated against opposing “German militarism.”126 
The Evening Star argued that the Bolsheviks signed “away Russia’s birthright” with the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and that Lenin deceitfully made the Russian people pawns of 
Germany.127 Other newspapers responded to the signing of the treaty by claiming Lenin 
and Germany were working together to cause a global uprising. These papers claimed that 
Lenin intended to “aid (a) Hun plot to stir rebellion” by letting Germany use Russian ships 
to bring German agents to the US, Japan, France, and England to create an industrial 
revolt.128  
Papers also ran articles that accused Lenin of betraying the Russian people by 
welcoming German invaders into Russia following the peace treaty, and that claimed 
Germany and Lenin were promoting “German-Lenin propaganda” in Russian Europe.129 
To many Americans, the news of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk came as an utter 
disappointment. They looked upon Russia with frustration for the country’s refusal to fight 
against Germany.130 Moreover, press coverage of this event reinforced supposed 
connections between Lenin and the Germans, and made the Bolsheviks appear to be 
wartime opponents to American readers. Focusing on some of the writings of the media, 
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hysteric fear of a German-Russian sponsored coup in democratic countries spiked in the 
American press following the signing of the Brest-Litovsk as well.  
With the Russians out of the war, the Eastern Front completely disintegrated and 
discussions amongst the Allied governments shifted to focus on intervention in Russia. 
Mostly these governments hoped that the Eastern Front could be re-opened through this 
action.131 Furthermore, the Allies felt other objectives might be achieved by intervening. 
Sentiments from Britain and France called for the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime by 
intervening in Russia’s developing civil war.132 Moreover, Japan and even officials within 
the US government sought American participation in a civil war intervention.133 The Allies 
wanted to prevent Germany from reaching Siberia and gaining the immense amount of war 
supplies that had accumulated in the port of Vladivostok during the war.134 These supplies 
included “various kinds of munitions and explosives, motor cars and trucks,” and 
“agricultural machinery.”135 The Allies did not want these materials to aid the German war 
effort in any way. Furthermore, the Allies worried about the hundreds of thousands of 
prisoners of war from the Central Powers that became free under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. 
Several Allied representatives became concerned that Germany might use these prisoners 
to gain control of Siberia. However, the Allies believed intervention could prevent such a 
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strategy from succeeding.136 Despite Russia’s exit from the war, there still seemed to be a 
lot to lose within the country for the Allies. 
In crafting a strategy for Russian intervention, the French and the British argued 
that the Japanese should take the most significant role in the effort to intervene in Siberia.137 
They hoped that Japan’s increased participation in the campaign might at the very least 
rattle Germany, in the event none of the other objectives of the Russian intervention could 
be accomplished.138 At first, Wilson refused to agree to intervention in Russia by any 
country. He felt suspicious of the motives of the other Allied governments. Wilson believed 
that Britain sought a new way to access the Middle East through Siberia, while France 
wanted to save part of its investment in Siberian and Manchurian railways.139 Moreover, 
Wilson felt that the Japanese held no desire to move into the country any further than 
Siberia and might attempt to use the intervention and occupation to expand the Japanese 
empire.140  
However, Wilson soon changed his mind toward intervention in Russia, due to 
various factors. On March 21, 1918, German forces began the Spring Offensive against 
Britain and France.141 At the time of the new offensive, the US only possessed six divisions 
of soldiers in France.142 Looking for aid in the fight, Britain and France both began to 
pressure Wilson to help open the Eastern Front once more through intervention in 
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Russia.143 Furthermore, Wilson received the Sisson documents in early May.144 These 
documents, delivered to the President by journalist Edgar Sisson, seemed to be evidence 
from the German Great General Staff that demonstrated that Lenin and Trotsky worked as 
German agents.145 Moreover, the documents claimed that the German government financed 
the revolution.146 Sisson obtained these documents on a trip to Russia while working for 
the Committee of Public Information.147 At the time, some suspected the Sisson documents 
to be forgeries, which George F. Kennan proved to be fake several decades later.148 
However, Wilson believed the papers to be authentic.149 The documents pushed Wilson 
closer to intervention, as it made the idea seem less like interfering with the self-
determination of the Russian people.150  
As Wilson further studied intervention, he learned of the Czechoslovak Legion in 
Russia, a special unit of Czechs and Slovaks that had deserted Austria-Hungary and 
Germany to join the Russian military and fight against the Central Powers.151 When the 
Russian military exited the war, it left the Czechs in a tough situation. The Czechoslovak 
Legion wanted to continue to fight the Central Powers, but did not have a clear path through 
the front lines to reach the Allies.152 A plan eventually developed to put the Czech unit 
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under French command and send them via the Trans-Siberian railway to Vladivostok to be 
shipped to the Western Front.153 The Bolsheviks decided to allow the Czech unit to travel 
on the railway so long as the group disarmed. However, after the Bolsheviks discovered 
smuggled weapons on train cars carrying Czechs, conflict broke out between the two 
groups.154 The Czech Legion managed to take control of a significant portion of the Trans-
Siberian railway, and opposed the Bolsheviks through armed resistance and with the 
support of the White army.155 This situation intensified the demands of Britain and France 
for intervention to provide aid for the Czech allies. It also gave Wilson a justifiable reason 
for intervening, as he wanted to help the stranded Czech unit.156 
With German pressure on the Western Front, the Sisson documents, and the fate of 
the Czech unit weighing on his mind, Wilson began to plan to send troops to Russia. On 
July 17, 1918, Wilson agreed to send American troops to north Russia to participate in an 
intervention.157 He approved of sending soldiers to the Russian ports of Archangel, 
Murmansk, and Vladivostok.158 He also agreed to a unilateral plan with the Japanese to 
send roughly several thousand troops to Vladivostok.159 Wilson demanded that all 
countries involved in the intervention state clearly to the Russian people that no military 
planned to interfere with the sovereignty of Russia, nor did they plan to take control of 
Russian territory. He felt that any violence or aggression towards the Russians might only 
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end up helping Germany.160 Furthermore, Wilson stated that the only objectives of 
American troops in Russia were to protect Allied military stockpiles in the ports and aiding 
the Czechoslovak Legion.161  
While the US government conceived and implemented plans for intervention, 
stories about treachery and terror in Russia ran in newspapers across the country. After 
returning to America following a six-month stay in Russia, New York Herald reporter 
Herman Bernstein started publishing an eight-part series of articles in newspapers across 
the nation in June aimed at exposing the “system of German espionage in Russia and 
elsewhere,” “German domination in Russia,” “Bolshevik reign of terror and tyranny in 
Russia.”162 Through his articles, Bernstein promoted the theory that German espionage 
caused the collapse of both tsarism and the Provisional Government, arguing that Germany 
premeditated and implemented these plans even before the war began. He wrote that 
Russian soldiers believed German sympathizers influenced Nicholas II to take charge of 
the Russian military and that the soldiers hated Empress Alexandra because they suspected 
she secretly acted in the interest of Germany.163 Additionally, Bernstein argued that Kaiser 
Wilhelm II riddled “Russia with German spies” by having German agents enter Russia as 
“photographers, salesmen, cattle dealers, or lumber merchants.”164 According to Bernstein, 
during the war, German spies infiltrated the Russian military and government. He also 
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claimed that they sabotaged the Russian war effort by agitating strikes in factories and 
completely shutting factories down by taking ownership of them.165 Bernstein’s writings 
portrayed Russia as a “German colony” from the start of the war, playing to American fears 
of German sabotage in their own country.166  
 Bernstein’s series of articles on Bolsheviks continued to appear in the press. 
Bernstein traveled to Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution in hopes that the 
Bolsheviks would create a functioning government, but said he left disappointed. The New 
York Herald reporter accused Lenin and Trotsky of being German agents and described the 
Red Guards as a murderous “band of thieves.”167 Bernstein also discredited the soviets 
throughout Russia, accusing them of being unrepresentative of the Russian people. He 
further warned Americans that the soviets were full of Bolsheviks who were attempting to 
spread propaganda to win American favor, even though the Bolsheviks hated the US and 
President Wilson.168 Overall, Bernstein’s articles appealed to American fears that the 
Bolsheviks were enemies of the US, allies of Germany, and oppressors of the Russian 
people.  
In mid-August, American participation in the Allied Intervention began as two 
infantry regiments of US troops landed in Vladivostok.169 Between these two regiments, 
the US placed nearly 3,000 troops in Russia.170 Another 5,000 US troops landed at the 
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beginning of September.171 General William Graves, who commanded the troops, realized 
that the mission that Wilson sent them on did not align with neutrality. By aiding the 
Czechs in any form, they helped a group fighting alongside the White Army against the 
Bolsheviks in a civil war.172 Still, he tried his best during the campaign in Russia to hold 
his men to Wilson’s orders to avoid violent conflict with the Russian people.173 On 
September 4, 1918, an estimated 4,500 US soldiers arrived at Archangel to participate in 
the Russian intervention under British control.174 The British placed General F.C. Poole in 
charge of their operations in Russia. Poole held vastly different designs on Russia than 
Wilson. He wanted to invade deep into the country, hoping to rally Russians against the 
Bolsheviks.175 The British also wanted to push to Finland to open a front there against the 
German army.176 The US did not agree to this plan, however177  
Furthermore, the British helped to overthrow Archangel’s local soviet in August, 
and remained engaged in combat with the Bolsheviks at the time of the American arrival.178 
Prior to the intervention, Wilson threatened to pull American support if the British used 
US troops in a way that he disliked. However, despite the British implementing US troops 
in a way Wilson advised against, he did not uphold his threat nor did he do anything to 
prevent the British from deploying US soldiers against the Bolsheviks.179 Wilson’s failure 
to hold the British to his demands allowed the Bolsheviks to claim that the US used military 
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power to interfere in Russia, which strained US and Russian relations thereafter.180 The 
Japanese and British overreaches in Russia also showed that Wilson did not hold enough 
power to control the situation and keep the Allied forces in check as he hoped. 
Despite the problems the Wilson administration faced with the opening months of 
the Allied Intervention, the press portrayed the allies and the American troops entering 
Russia as heroes. In some cases, newspapers published stories about how the Russian 
people welcomed the Allied troops as liberators against their Bolshevik oppressors.181 
Articles also portrayed Allied troops as saviors and restorers of Russia.182 Even though the 
Wilson administration claimed no desire to interfere with the Bolsheviks, newspapers 
wrote that the Allied troops were working to overthrow the Bolsheviks and give Russia 
back to the Russian people. The Dispatch in Moline, Illinois published a story about 
Edward Heald, an American soldier in Russia with a “story of brave struggle to hold the 
Bolsheviki,” while the Buffalo Evening News declared that “Bolshevist terror ends when 
Allies march in.”183 Some articles continued to connect the Bolsheviks to the Germans and 
made the intervention out to be a military move against Germany. In an article in the 
Evening Star in Washington DC, a journalist declared that there were “no longer any doubts 
as to Lenine’s desire to assist Germany” and the article argued that the untrustworthy 
Bolsheviks would fall to the Allies.184 The Times from Shreveport, Louisiana called the 
Bolsheviks “tools of the Kaiser” and wrote that the Bolshevik forces fleeing the Allied 
armies of Britain, France, Japan, and the US in Russia amounted to a significant blow to 
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Germany.185 The Cincinnati Enquirer wrote that the “Bolsheviki are masks covering 
Germans” and it went on to claim that the German government intended to use the 
Bolsheviks to conquer Siberia.186 Articles like these show that, no matter what Wilson 
hoped to achieve with US participation in the Allied Intervention, the press portrayed the 
operation as a military struggle against Germany and the Bolsheviks.  
On September 15, Wilson played into fears that the German government stood 
behind the Bolsheviks when he decided to release the Sisson documents to the American 
people. He used these to portray the Bolsheviks to the public as German agents in order to 
gain popular support for the deployment of American troops to Russia.187 The press spread 
the contents of the Sisson documents to readers throughout the country. The Albuquerque 
Journal ran a headline declaring Lenin and Trotsky “paid Kaiser Agents,” while the 
Philadelphia Inquirer claimed that the two Communist leaders betrayed Russia.188 
Meanwhile, the Oregon Daily Journal published a paper with a headline reading “Helping 
hand of America may yet save Russians,” which expressed the hope that the US might 
break Germany’s control of Russia.189 The September 15, 1918, issue of the New York 
Times contained the Sisson documents in full and declared that “Berlin financed the 
revolution” and the documents proved that Germany hired Lenin and Trotsky.190 Head of 
the Finnish Information Bureau, S. Nuorteva, declared the Sisson documents to be forgeries 
days following their release. However, the US government defended the documents and 
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claimed them to be “authentic.”191 By releasing the documents, Wilson failed to be 
transparent with the American people about the US government’s true objectives in Russia, 
instead making it seem that the government sent US troops to Russia to oppose Germany. 
Moreover, Wilson validated false rumors that the Bolsheviks were German puppets. 
Even though Wilson did not want US troops to engage in combat with Bolshevik 
fighters, American soldiers still at times found themselves in conflict with the Red Army. 
During the fall of 1918, the press covered these stories from Russia. On September 18, the 
newspapers reported that Bolsheviks attacked American soldiers in Archangel. Red Army 
forces raided and shelled the American position, leading to the first American casualty of 
the intervention. However, according to the papers, the Americans withstood the attack and 
inflicted significant damage on the Bolshevik attackers. The San Francisco Examiner 
covered the story under the headline “Bolsheviki Defeated by Americans,” while the Salt 
Lake Herald-Republican published an article about the skirmish under the headlines “First 
Dead of U.S. in North Russia Buried” and “Bolshevik Raid Made on American Outpost is 
Cause of Casualties.”192 Other articles from early October stated that the American forces 
were approaching Bolshevik territory and facing the threat of Bolshevik gunboats.193 
Ultimately, Wilson’s decision to intervene led to Americans fighting Bolsheviks, even if 
that is not what he intended. As American newspapers published articles about the 
experiences of American troops in Russia, the Bolsheviks became enemies of war to the 
American public. This development should be considered one of the factors that shaped 
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both American perceptions of the Bolsheviks in the First Red Scare and the hostilities that 
would lead eventually to the Cold War. 
On November 11, 1918, World War I ended when Germany signed an armistice.194 
Germany had lost the war.195 However, the Allied forces still remained in Russia, as the 
French and British kept trying to find ways to weaken the Bolshevik regime, the Japanese 
continued to occupy parts of Siberia, and the US pushed to evacuate the Czechs.196 To the 
American public, this situation could only be perceived as confusing, since the supposed 
German puppet, the Bolsheviks, still remained in power, despite Germany’s surrender. As 
US troops remained in Russia, the Bolsheviks came to be viewed as America’s primary 
enemy.197 The press continued to cover the Allied Intervention, publishing articles titled 
“Bolshevik War Still on Going” and “Bolshevik Rulers Continue Reign of Terror.”198 
Newspapers wrote about conflicts American troops continued to experience against the 
Bolsheviks. One of these battles happened on November 1, when British and American 
troops fought Bolshevik infantry and experienced shelling from Bolshevik gunships. Some 
papers wrote that “as long as the enemy gunboats are able to move the Americans and 
British are combatting great odds.”199 Newspaper articles also reminded Americans that 
even though the war with Germany was finished, Americans still needed to defeat the 
anarchism of the Bolsheviks both at home and abroad.200 Even with World War I over, the 
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press made it seem as if there was still a war left to fight. The Bolsheviks lingered, despite 
Germany’s defeat, and the US could not rest until the red threat also surrendered. 
In many ways, the Wilson administration and the American press together created 
the image of the Bolshevik enemy for the American public. By confidently claiming the 
unstable Provisional Government in Russia to be a great ally of democracy against 
autocratic Germany, both unintentionally made the Bolshevik coup out to be the 
overthrowing of a strong democracy. Throughout the remainder of 1917 and the rest of 
1918, the Wilson administration and the American press stoked the worst fears of the 
American public about the Bolsheviks, connecting them to American anti-German 
sentiment. Moreover, the US government and American press would continue to stir 
hysteria and bolster American fears of Bolshevism in 1919 and 1920 in much the same 
way they did in the year following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Moreover, the fear 
of the Bolsheviks that manifested in America during the First Red Scare would cause US-





Chapter 3:  American Bolsheviki: The Beginning of the First Red Scare, 1917 to 
1918 
 A consensus has developed among historians that in the early months of 1919, 
widespread panic consumed the American public and government as many came to fear a 
Bolshevik coup of the United States government and the undermining of the American 
way of life, and this fear persisted until 1920. Known as the First Red Scare, this period 
became one of the most well-known episodes of American fear of Communism in US 
history. Americans accused labor protestors, the Industrial Workers of the World, and the 
Socialist Party of America of being Bolshevik agents. With this focus on the events of 
1919 to 1920, however, historians of the First Red Scare have often ignored the initial 
American reaction to the October Revolution in late 1917 and throughout 1918. A study 
of this earlier period demonstrates that American fear and hatred of Bolshevism emerged 
immediately after the Bolshevik coup of the Provisional Government. For over a year 
prior to 1919, the American press, American authorities, and American leaders claimed 
the American Bolsheviki plotted to seize control of the US. Moreover, during this time, 
these American entities labeled anarchists, socialists, and Industrial Workers of the 
World members as Bolshevik agents and persecuted anyone they felt to be supporting 
Bolshevism or associated with it. While fear of Bolshevism in American society during 
the period of 1917 to 1918 did not become as widespread as it did from 1919 to 1920, a 
study of these early years aids historical understanding of how the First Red Scare 
developed in American society and challenges widely accepted notions of when the First 
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Red Scare began. Also, by expanding the timeline of the First Red Scare, the connections 
between this period and World War I become clearer.  
While members of the Socialist Party and IWW became prominent targets of First 
Red Scare hysteria, the persecution they faced from late 1917 to 1920 came as a 
continuation of harassment these groups faced since early 1917 when America entered 
World War I. As the US went to war, the US government became concerned with 
suppressing and apprehending suspected enemy agents within America to prevent them 
from hindering the American war effort. As IWW members and Socialists opposed the 
war, the government began suppressing these groups in June 1917 with the passing of the 
Espionage Act. One of the first steps the federal government took under this new law was 
to exclude Socialist and IWW publications from the mail, as the government categorized 
these groups’ newspapers and magazines as suspicious and un-American.201 These 
publications included Socialist literature such as American Socialist, Appeal to Reason, 
and International Socialist Review and IWW periodicals such as Solidarity and Industrial 
Worker.202 As the war continued, the federal government used its power in an attempt to 
destroy leftist publications and literature.203 Moreover, the government believed that 
Socialists and IWW members were pro-German activists, and that the best way to stop 
their disloyal ideas from infecting the American public would be to silence their voice in 
the press.204  
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Even though the federal government accused both the Socialist Party and the 
IWW of being pro-German, it seemed to despise the IWW the most.205 During the spring 
and summer of 1917, the IWW organized workers and led strikes within industries 
necessary for the war movement such as lumber, agriculture, and mining.206 With the 
union’s influence in these vital wartime industries, the government viewed the IWW as a 
domestic threat to the economy and war effort. Thus, the government began plotting to 
destroy the IWW.207 As the IWW carried on strikes for better working conditions in 
wartime industries, the government came to believe that the IWW might be using these 
demonstrations as an attempt to purposefully hinder the war effort.208 Moreover, the 
government suspected that Germans might be funding IWW to organize these strikes.209 
In an effort to acquire evidence to prove this suspicion, on September 5, 1917, the Justice 
Department raided over 48 IWW meeting places throughout the country. Federal agents 
seized tons of IWW propaganda, letters, publications, literature, and financial records.210 
However, the Justice Department found no evidence of German connections in the 
documents it collected.211 Yet, the federal government still perceived the IWW to be a 
threat to the nation’s security for its ability to organize strikes. While the evidence 
collected did not point to the IWW being supported by the Germans, it did put the union 
in violation of the Espionage Act. On September 28, over 166 IWW members were 
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indicted with conspiracy to obstruct the draft, including Bill Haywood, the leader of the 
radical union.212 Thus, even before the First Red Scare, the US government suspected 
members of the Socialist Party and the IWW of being German sympathizers. By the end 
of 1917, however, members from both of these groups would be simultaneously 
perceived as supporters of Germany and Bolshevik agents. 
Prior to the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, Americans grew fond of the 
Provisional Government that succeeded the tsarist regime in March 1917. On March 22, 
The US became the first country to recognize the Provisional Government.213 In his war 
message to Congress on April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson cited the Provisional 
Government as an example of Russia’s natural democratic values and claimed that the 
rise of this new government in Russia made World War I a battle between democratic 
and autocratic governments.214 Likewise, newspapers across the country celebrated the 
democracy of the Provisional Government as progress towards a more peaceful world 
and portrayed American and Russian values as similar. 215 Thus, for most Americans, the 
Bolshevik coup of the Provisional Government on November 7, 1917 came as a harsh 
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introduction to the Bolshevik Party.216 The American press labeled the Bolsheviks as 
illegitimate usurpers, criminals, and dictators.217  
In a speech to the American Federation of Labor on November 12, President 
Wilson vaguely referenced the Bolsheviks as unrepresentative of the interests of the 
Russian people and expressed fear that groups in America had developed plots to cause 
anarchy and lawlessness throughout the country and that their “mob spirit” held sway 
over parts of the American population.218 He also stressed a need for unity between 
classes and groups of people to avoid class struggle.219 Given these statements, Wilson 
expressed worry for the first time that an event similar to the Bolshevik Revolution might 
happen in the US. Newspapers immediately reported on Wilson’s speech to the AFL. 
Brainerd Daily Dispatch stated that some claimed “German agents” and “American 
Bolsheviki” plotted to gain control of the AFL from the organization’s president, Samuel 
Gompers.220 In an article titled “Opponents of Samuel Gompers called ‘American 
Bolshevikers,’” the Anniston Star in Alabama wrote that Gompers ran for re-election as 
president of the AFL on a pro-war campaign, and declared his opponents “American 
Bolsheviki.”221 Also according to the Anniston Star, A.A. Landon, President of the 
Chamber of Commerce, gave a speech at the AFL meeting in which he warned of internal 
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divisions in the organization and not to let the AFL fall victim to the work of pacifists 
and German sympathizers.222 The News Herald in Franklin, Pennsylvania stated the same 
warning.223  
Other newspapers reporting on Wilson’s speech and the Bolshevik revolution 
declared that the American Bolsheviki planned to infect American labor through the 
Industrial Workers of the World and the Socialist Party and to spread anarchy and terror 
in American society.224 The immediate reaction of Wilson, Gompers, Landon, and the 
American press to the October Revolution demonstrated the worry that Bolshevik agents 
plotted to use American labor as a vehicle for revolution developed almost instantly 
following the coup against the Provisional Government in Russia. Likewise, the national 
press coverage showed that fears of Bolshevik radicalism infiltrating American 
institutions and causing a Bolshevik revolution in the US spread quickly throughout the 
country following the October Revolution. 
 Also, directly following the Bolshevik Revolution, the American press published 
panicked stories telling of Leon Trotsky’s time in the US from January to April 1917.225 
The Bridgeport Times and Evening Farmer in Bridgeport, Connecticut said that before 
Trotsky became “the new president of Russia,” he built a renowned reputation in New 
York as a radical socialist.226 Some articles presented Trotsky as a threat that the US 
fortunately avoided, as the Charlotte News claimed the government labeled him a 
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troublemaker and the Detroit Free Press wrote in a headline that “Leon Trotsky 
Attempted to Organize Treason in the United States.”227 William G. Shepherd, a United 
Press correspondent, published an article that appeared in multiple newspapers across the 
country in which he claimed not only Trotsky, but Lenin, had stayed in New York.228 He 
went on to say that Germany “poisoned and paralyzed” Russia by allowing Lenin to 
return there freely, and that if either Lenin or Trotsky had remained in America, then the 
Bolshevik Revolution might have occurred in the US instead of Russia.229 Shepherd 
cautioned readers, though, warning that “friends and sympathizers” of Trotsky and Lenin 
remained in the US and aimed to create their own Bolshevik revolution on American 
soil.230  
Various articles described the relations Trotsky built with American radicals. 
Frederick M. Kerby published an article based on interviews he conducted with Trotsky’s 
colleagues in New York, learning that Trotsky helped edit a socialist paper for the 
Socialist Party.231 Other articles stressed that radical socialists in America of both 
Russian and German descent welcomed and aided Trotsky during his residency in New 
York, even offering him places to stay and giving him furniture.232 Like the press 
coverage centered around Wilson’s speech to the AFL in Buffalo, the media’s nation-
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wide attention to the time Trotsky spent living in New York evidenced a rapid formation 
of collective fear of the Bolsheviks in American society directly following the Bolshevik 
Party’s overthrow of the Provisional Government. Stories of Trotsky’s presence in the 
US prior to the October Revolution made it seem as if the coup could have happened in 
America and that the threat still lingered, due to the ties he built with other radicals while 
in New York. 
On November 16, Theodore Roosevelt gave further credence to a radical 
Bolshevik threat lurking within America during a speech he delivered in Princeton, New 
Jersey. As the primary purpose of the speech, Roosevelt advocated for the US to declare 
war on Austria and Turkey as part of the fight to safeguard democracy around the world. 
In listing other threats to democratic governments, Roosevelt also labeled the Bolsheviks 
the “worst foes of liberty and democracy” and claimed pacifists, German sympathizers, 
American socialists, and the Industrial Workers of the World wanted to destroy the US in 
the same way the Bolsheviks decimated “free Russia.”233 Additionally, he accused 
individuals such as Robert La Follette, Morris Hillquit, and Victor Berger of being 
Bolshevik sympathizers.234 La Follette was a progressive senator from Wisconsin, while 
Hillquit and Berger were prominent socialist politicians.235 Roosevelt’s speech marked 
the first time following the October Revolution a renowned American political figure 
directly named groups and people he considered to be involved in the plotting a socialist 
revolution in America. Furthermore, his speech received nation-wide coverage in the 
press. Papers around the country discussed how Colonel Roosevelt attacked the IWW and 
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assailed the “American Bolsheviki,” a term that was becoming a catch-all for radical 
activity in the US.236 This speech reversed the argument made in April 1917 by President 
Wilson that Russia fought on the side of democracy.237 Arguably, at this moment, 
Roosevelt helped set the national tone of the hysteria surrounding Bolshevism in America 
for years to come. 
Following Roosevelt’s speech, the American media represented the Socialist 
Party as one of the most prominent representatives of the American Bolsheviki. The New 
York Times claimed that the Socialist Party and the Bolsheviks in Russia held strong 
connections to each other, and that both of their ideologies possessed Germanic origins 
and influence. The paper further explained that the socialists acted as a “menace” to 
America and its war effort, due to their pro-German stance.238 Meanwhile, the News-
Journal in Mansfield, Ohio, claimed that American Bolsheviki wanted the US to 
surrender its independence and become subservient to warmongering Germany.239  
Likewise, the IWW began to be labeled by the American press as prominently 
connected with the Bolsheviks following Roosevelt’s address. On December 23, a 
Russian ship called the Shilka docked in a port in Seattle, Washington.240 Members of the 
IWW invited the sailors to their local hall to discuss the revolutionary events occurring in 
Russia. However, when authorities discovered the IWW was socializing with the sailors, 
they arrested twenty-one of the IWW members.241 Moreover, members of the Office of 
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Naval Intelligence feared that ship held a cargo of revolutionary Bolshevik literature to 
spread to radicals throughout America, Europe and Australia.242 The New York Times 
also reported that authorities worried that the Shilka brought $100,000 in gold to help pay 
legal fees of IWW members facing trial in Chicago for conspiracy charges.243 After 
searching the ship, however, the Bureau of Investigation uncovered no evidence of 
criminal or revolutionary conspiracies. Instead, the ship’s cargo consisted of licorice root, 
peas, and beans.244 Found innocent, the Shilka received a load of pig iron and left to 
return to Russia in early January 1918.245 
Still, throughout the first few months of 1918, fear of the American Bolsheviki 
remained prevalent in the press. During January, a political cartoon titled “A Warning to 
American Bolshevikism” appeared in newspapers across the country.246 The image 
represented the American Bolshevik as an unkempt, bearded, and ill-looking man and 
depicted him with his head and hands locked in a pillory with “social law and order 
stocks” written across the wooden bar.247 He wore a coat, and pieces of paper stuck out of 
his pockets that read “I.W.W.,” “plots,” “anarchy,” “revolution,” and “Bolshevikism.”248 
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Beside him, a sign warned other American Bolsheviks of the US government’s 
intolerance for any protest or action that might hinder America’s war effort. Through the 
message of the sign, the cartoon portrayed the American Bolshevik as a criminal 
conspiring against the US and a violator of the Espionage Act of 1917, showing 
Americans feared the American Bolshevik as a threat to the country’s ability to win the 
war.249 
On February 17, the press reported that a disturbance involving over 4,000 
Bolshevik sympathizers erupted in Chicago. According to an article in the Chicago 
Tribune titled “Judge Driven from Hall by Bolshevik Din,” the group of sympathizers 
gathered in Douglas Park auditorium to hear Professor George Lomonosoff, President of 
the Russian mission on ways and communication, speak on ways to offer aid to poor 
Russians.250 A man the paper referred to as Alderman Rodriguez, a renowned Chicago 
socialist, was supposed to chair the meeting, but did not attend. When Judge Harry M. 
Fischer filled the position of chair in Rodriguez’s place, it surprised the crowd, and they 
shouted at the judge: “who are you?,” “where is Rodriguez?,” “Bolsheviki,” and “Down 
with Fischer.”251 Fischer ended up leaving the meeting, but Dr. Moses Sahud, a socialist, 
managed to fill the chair position and calm the crowd. Lomonosoff gave a speech inside 
and another to a crowd of leftists outside of the auditorium. After Lomonosoff finished 
speaking, the Chicago Tribune reported that an “unidentified anarchist” claimed 
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Lomonosoff represented the bourgeoisie and not the proletariat of Russia.252 However, 
police forced the heckler to leave.253 
While the Chicago Tribune described the Bolshevik sympathizers as highly 
energetic and disruptive audience members, many newspapers reported on this event with 
great hysteria and sensationalism. The Salt Lake Herald-Republican wrote that 4,000 
Bolsheviki rioted in the streets of Chicago to silence Lomonosoff, and that the city called 
in the police to put the “mob” down.254 Likewise, the Nebraska State Journal called the 
meeting “a Bolsheviki rough house” and claimed that 4,000 American Bolsheviks led 
two riots throughout Chicago that police had to use clubs and guns to stop.255 The Journal 
Gazette in Mattoon, Illinois, stated that it took 15 police to halt a “mob of 4,000 Trotsky 
disciples,” who started a riot at the meeting concerning Russia.256 
Other papers stressed the role of the police in these riots. The Washington Post 
ran a headline titled “Chicago Police Rout Bolsheviki,” while both the Atlanta 
Constitution and the El Paso Herald wrote that Bolsheviki rioters shouted “long live the 
Bolsheviki” in Chicago until the police scattered the 4,000 person crowd.257 Moreover, 
some of these papers claimed that the rioting began after the Bolshevik sympathizers 
became upset when Lomonosoff said that the same hunger problems throughout Russia 
that brought about the end of the tsar would also destroy the Bolshevik regime.258 
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Ultimately, the national press coverage and the local reporting describe the same event 
much differently, with the local press portraying a much less violent and chaotic scene 
than that of other newspapers across the country. 
 On March 23, University of Michigan President Harry B. Hutchins called on 
Americans to be alarmed by the presence of the American Bolsheviki throughout the US 
in a speech he gave at the University of California as the Charter Day speaker during the 
University’s semi-centennial celebration.259 In his address, titled “The World War and 
Some of Its By-Products,” Hutchins claimed that the conflict would cause a strong 
movement “to bring about social and economic revolution.”260 He argued that American 
Bolsheviki planned to lead this move for change, but he did not specifically define 
American Bolsheviki. Hutchins claimed that the American Bolshevik movement drew 
their numbers from foreigners, who held hostile and hateful feelings for the established 
government and economic systems in the US.  
Additionally, Hutchins believed “ignorance” and “evil leadership” shaped the 
sentiments of this “foreign contingent,” and that they aimed to destroy the stable 
American government and replace it with anarchy.261 The University of Michigan 
President also mentioned that many of these foreigners worked in numerous industries 
throughout the US, giving them an opportunity to influence the minds of American 
workers and shut down production of materials important to the war effort.262 Just as 
Landon, Gompers, and Wilson’s reactions in the immediate aftermath of the October 
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Revolution showed fear that Bolsheviks aimed to use American labor to devastate the 
country, Hutchins’ analysis of the Bolshevik threat five months after the revolution 
continued to demonstrate that same panic.  
 Furthermore, in facing the threat of the American Bolsheviki, Hutchins argued 
Americans must adopt a new conception of Americanism and American citizenship.263 
By Americanism, Hutchins meant an ideological nationalism that encapsulated 
conservative American values. The term Americanism first originated in the mid-1800s 
during the nativist Know-Nothing movement, and it resurfaced again at the start of World 
War I. During the war, promoters of Americanism used this concept to define their vision 
of an ideal American. According to them, Americans needed to align with Protestant 
beliefs, learn English, and conform to capitalist and patriarchal systems. Additionally, 
Americanism called for US citizens to participate in all patriotic displays and ceremonies, 
and to support their country.264  
Hutchins put the tenets of Americanism on display in his speech as he quoted 
Theodore Roosevelt, saying that every alien that came to the US needed to learn English 
and start taking steps to becoming a citizen within the first few years of residency. 
Hutchins further argued that the government needed to enact naturalization laws.265 He 
also believed it necessary for the US government to limit immigration to the US, thus 
lessening the country’s chances of allowing violent and radical aliens to infiltrate its 
borders. He proposed internment camps for aliens as another solution to neutralize the 
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foreign threat of the American Bolsheviki.266 Importantly, Hutchins’ concerns 
demonstrate both a hysteric fear of Bolsheviks infiltrating American labor and an 
emphasis on using Americanism to fight Bolshevism just short of a year prior to the First 
Red Scare.267 Also, the press carried his warning to the American people nationwide, 
helping to make Americans alarmed at the supposed threat of Bolshevism as well.268 
 Following Hutchins’ speech, Theodore Roosevelt gave a speech on March 22, 
criticizing the American Bolsheviki once again.269 Roosevelt began his speech by 
ridiculing President Wilson’s handling of the war, claiming the Wilson administration’s 
“kid gloves and fine phrases” approach to fighting Germany to be ineffective.270 He 
stated that the US went unprepared into the war and now needed to declare war on 
Austria and Turkey. Roosevelt attacked German-Americans and pacifists in the US as 
part of the problem as well, claiming they held the war effort back and infected the nation 
with “red folly.”271 He warned Americans that “the Bolsheviki have no more to teach 
America than the Romanoffs” about inefficiency and despotism and that Americans 
should avoid following the path of the American Bolsheviki, unless they wanted to cause 
chaos and ruin within the US.272 Again, many press outlets throughout the country carried 
Roosevelt’s call for alarm.273 While his speech mostly focused on war with Germany, 
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Roosevelt worried that the American Bolsheviki, if unchecked, could hurt the American 
war effort and harm the US in the same way the Bolsheviks damaged Russia. 
 On May 15, American panic concerning a Bolshevik revolution spiked once again 
when police arrested three Russian anarchists in New York City and charged them with 
plotting to overthrow the US government and bring about a “reign of terror” in 
America.274 The New York Times reported that police thwarted a secretive “nation-wide 
anarchist plot” purposed to spread Bolshevism across America.275 The paper named one 
of those arrested as Ivan Novikoff, a Russian who worked at Nova Mir, a press company 
which the New York Times claimed held connections to Leon Trotsky.276 During the 
arrest, police seized 30,000 copies of a radical monthly periodical known as Kolokol, a 
publication in which the New York Times claimed the radicals wrote about staging an 
uprising against the government and planned to send to cities across the country such as 
Chicago, Pittsburgh, Detroit, San Francisco, and Boston.277  
Moreover, the paper stated the police possessed a list of names of thousands of 
suspected “sympathizers and supporters” of the New York City anarchist group from 
across the US.278 The authorities boasted that the arrest of these three anarchists came as 
the most significant apprehension of radicals since they took Emma Goldman and 
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Alexander Berkman into custody. Additionally, the New York Times reported that a 
Justice Department agent believed the anarchist group arrested in New York City was the 
“most dangerous group of anarchists” to operate on American soil, and that the agent 
feared the radicalizing effects of the group’s propaganda might influence the many 
Russian workers laboring in US shipyards and factories.279  
Media outlets throughout the country also reported on these arrests. The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, the Natchez Democrat, the Reno Gazette-Journal, and the 
Courier-Journal claimed the three arrested Russians to be “adherents of Lenine and 
Trotsky” and connected to the IWW.280 These papers also warned readers that the 
anarchist group in New York City worked alongside many other anarchists in numerous 
other American cities to overthrow the government.281 Meanwhile, the Asbury Park Press 
praised the police for stopping the anarchists from carrying out their Bolshevik plot.282 
The Washington Post wrote that the three Bolsheviki-affiliated anarchists passed around 
pamphlets “printed in Russian and conveying instructions as to how to ‘overthrow the 
government.’”283 Ultimately, the treatment of these three Russian anarchists as dangerous 
revolutionaries capable of and plotting to stage a Bolshevik revolution in the US by the 
authorities and the national press demonstrated a failure of newspapers and the police to 
differentiate between anarchists and communists. Moreover, the reaction of the national 
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press specifically provided proof that bouts of hysteric fear of a Bolshevik uprising 
throughout the United States occurred earlier than 1919. 
Throughout 1918, American authorities, specifically the Bureau of Investigation, 
also maintained suspicion of anyone they viewed as connected with the Bolsheviks. In 
July 1918, the Bureau investigated the Manhattan Finnish Workman Association, a group 
it labeled a “Finnish Bolshevik Society,” for alleged Bolshevik propaganda.284 In 
September, an investigator took note of a Bolshevik group’s activity in Baltimore, 
Maryland. The investigator reported that the Bolshevik radicals met to organize terror 
and trouble within both Baltimore and America.285 Similarly, in September, Bureau 
investigators kept watch over a “Soviet of Workmen Deputies in San Francisco” that they 
believed consisted of Russian Bolsheviks and American IWW members.286 Bureau 
investigators feared that the San Francisco Soviet used and spread radical propaganda to 
indoctrinate members to commit illegal and disloyal acts against the US. Moreover, they 
claimed that groups like the one in San Francisco had been established throughout the 
country, and the authorities deemed Russian workers the most vulnerable to these groups’ 
ideals. Like Hutchins’ speech in March, the perspectives of these investigators 
demonstrate worry that foreigners and members of the working class were more likely to 
support the Bolsheviks. Their investigations also show that authorities feared widespread 
Bolshevik activity in the US prior to 1919.287  
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In other instances, the Bureau of Investigation investigated individuals such as 
Carl G. Bedrit for disloyalty and association with the Bolsheviks. In October 1918, the 
Bureau targeted Bedrit because he was Russian and his coworkers nicknamed him 
“Bolsheviki.”288 After interrogating Bedrit, however, the Bureau discovered that Bedrit 
did not harbor disloyal feelings towards the US. Rather, Bedrit’s coworkers assigned him 
the nickname because he did not buy a liberty bond and they accused him of being a 
Bolshevik or IWW member.289 In the summer and fall of 1918, the Bureau also looked 
into cases involving Bolshevik newspapers, Bolshevik teachings deemed “against the 
US”, and other “Bolshevik matter(s).”290 Overall, the Bureau of Investigation’s activity 
during 1918 demonstrated that the agency viewed Bolshevism as a national threat and 
wanted to keep track of Bolshevik activities throughout the country. 
As 1918 continued, leftists faced trouble. On November 24, the Socialist Party of 
Minnesota and Hennepin County planned to hold a rally at the Gateway Park in 
Minneapolis. However, when Sheriff Otto Langum received word of the socialist 
gathering, he banned the meeting from taking place. Despite Langum’s orders, socialists 
still planned to gather for the rally in Gateway Park. Langum responded by asking 
Governor Joseph A. A. Burnquist for help in stopping the socialists from meeting, and 
Burnquist sent National Guard infantry regiments.291 Over 12,000 socialists gathered for 
                                                          
288 Bureau of Investigation, Carl G. Bedrit. Alleged Disloyal Remarks, by J. G. Shuey, October 21, 
1918, Fold3.com, Old German Files, 1909-21, accessed October 12, 2018, 
https://www.fold3.com/image/3065988. 
289 Bureau of Investigation, Carl G. Bedrit. 
290 Bureau of Investigation, Daily Digest of Clippings, August 17, 1918, Fold3.com, Old German 
Files, 1909-21, accessed October 12, 2018. https://www.fold3.com/image/2788390; Bureau of 
Investigation, P. Kuresuk or J. Kucseruk, October 26, 1918, Fold3.Com, Old German Files, 1909-21, 
accessed October 12, 2018, https://www.fold3.com/image/33132313. 
291 “Crowd Halts Tiny Parade of Socialists,” Star Tribune, November 25, 1918; “The Proscribed 
Socialist Rally,” Star Tribune, November 25, 1918.  
62 
 
the meeting, and the Star Tribune wrote that some of the socialists carried signs 
advocating that the US recognize the new Soviet government in Russia.292 However, 
faced with National Guard units and sheriff deputies, the crowd of socialists dispersed 
quickly. The Star Tribune defended the actions of the Governor and the police, stating 
that the country was still at war and since the US socialists supported the Bolsheviks in 
Russia, the “radical adherents of the red flag have themselves to blame for the state of the 
public mind towards them.”293 Moreover, the paper declared that no true American could 
find it within themselves to support socialist doctrine.294 The actions of Burnquist and 
Langum demonstrated the ways red hysteria influenced both local and state political 
operations following the end of World War I on November 11. Even though the US 
signed an armistice, socialists continued to face discrimination due to their support of the 
Bolshevik government. 
Socialists faced persecution in New York City even after the war ended, when on 
November 19, Mayor John Francis Hylan banned displays of red flags and any 
unauthorized meetings in the city to prevent the “horrors and outrages of unrestricted 
mobs, which are now causing anxiety in neutral countries abroad.”295 On November 25, 
Hylan’s ban became the center of controversy, when over 10,000 socialists met at 
Madison Square Garden for a Socialist Party gathering. Even though Hylan banned red 
flags, the New York Times reported that “there was three to four times as much red on 
display” at this socialist rally than usual.296 Men attending the meeting wore red neckties 
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and attached red ribbons and red rosettes to their shirts, while the women wore red 
dresses, red sweaters, red sashes, and red hats.297In observance of the many people 
wearing red, Socialist Alderman Abraham Beckerman even said “we are thankful to 
Mayor Hylan for popularizing this color.”298 On occasion throughout the meeting, some 
socialists put red flags on display for seconds at a time.299  
However, when soldiers and sailors staying in the city heard word of the socialist 
gathering, they decided to disrupt the meeting because they believed the socialists to be 
“attacking” and “insulting” the American flag.300 According to the Buffalo Commercial, 
when around 1,000 soldiers and sailors gathered outside of Madison Square Garden 
during the meeting, denouncements of Bolshevism and calls for “loyal Americans” to 
help stop the socialists came from the crowd of military men and American civilians met 
their cries with cheers.301 The soldiers and sailors attempted to enter Madison Square 
Garden, but a line of police providing security for the socialist meeting stopped them 
from entering. So, the soldiers and sailors waited outside of the venue until the meeting 
ended to stage their attack. The police proved unable to stop the military crowd, and the 
sailors and soldiers used fists and clubs against the socialists leaving the meeting. Some 
socialists fought back, while others ran. Eventually, the situation calmed down as 
socialists managed to escape the scene by either fleeing on their own or being helped by 
police.302  
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Despite the anger of the military mob, the violence they caused only resulted in 
minor injuries. Throughout the night, authorities took nine socialists into custody, 
charging them with disturbing the peace and attempting to start a riot. However, police 
did not arrest any of the soldiers or sailors, nor did New York City authorities develop 
plans to punish them. An article in the Ithaca Journal titled “Men in Service Not Sorry 
They Beat Up ‘Reds’” claimed that “only” the soldiers and sailors showed pride from the 
battle scars they endured fighting against the red flag, but the Bolsheviki remained 
quiet.303 Moreover, the Buffalo Labor Journal declared that the “Bolshevik sympathizers” 
who praised “Bolshevik principles” “brought” the anger of the troops on themselves for 
their unpatriotic display.304 
On the night of November 26, the violent attacks on socialists from soldiers and 
sailors continued in New York City when over 1,000 of them attempted to disrupt a 
Women’s International League meeting at Palm Garden, a “Bolshevist Rally” according 
to the New York Times.305 The soldiers explicitly stated that they came to the meeting to 
oppose Bolshevism and attack Bolsheviks. While police confronted the crowd of soldiers 
and sailors for three hours and tried to hold them back, the men eventually broke through 
the line of police and beat the attendees as they exited the meeting. One of the people 
attacked was a bystander who had no connection to the socialists.306 Following this night 
of rioting, city officials took two steps of action. To discourage soldiers and sailors from 
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attacking socialists, the police commissioner threatened to turn machine guns on the next 
group of military rioters.307 Moreover, the Board of Aldermen altered the ban on red flags 
to include black flags, banners, and signs that symbolized opposition to “organized 
government,” and made violating the ban punishable with a hundred-dollar fine and up to 
ten days in jail.308 Thus, the battle between Americanism and the suspected Bolshevik 
agents in New York City for the time being came to a close. While the city directed the 
soldiers and sailors to stop rioting, the men in uniform had won, as the city further 
encroached on the right of assembly of socialists than it had done previously.  
Given the events of late 1917 and 1918, 1919 did not mark the beginning of 
American fears of Bolshevism, but rather came as a continuation of red hysteria. As early 
as the October Revolution, Americans became paranoid and anxious that the same event 
could happen on American soil. Meanwhile, American politicians and media outlets 
expressed suspicions of groups they believed to be supporters of the Bolshevik Party such 
as the Socialist Party and the IWW, without making distinctions among these groups. 
Throughout this period, the American press ran sensational stories about these 
organizations, while American leaders greatly exaggerated and emphasized the danger of 
the American Bolsheviki lurking in their midst. These two groups helped shape American 
perceptions of Bolshevism, and increasingly created anxious, hateful, and hysteric 
feelings towards anything or anyone representative of the Bolsheviks or even leftist 
radical groups in American society. Furthermore, neither the press nor the government 
made attempts to educate the American public about the differences among Bolsheviks, 
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socialists, IWW members, and anarchists. This lack of differentiation among these groups 
made the American Bolsheviki seem larger and helped set the tone of American 




Chapter 4: The First Red Scare Continued, 1919 and 1920 
As the past two chapters demonstrated, Americans started to perceive Bolshevism 
as a domestic threat as early as November 1917 and continued to see the Bolsheviks as a 
menace to American society throughout 1918. During this period, hysteria surrounding the 
possibility of a Bolshevik coup of the United States government became prevalent in 
America, and Americans began to view groups such as the Industrial Workers of the World, 
Socialist Party, and anarchists, among others; as Bolshevik supporters willing and capable 
of infiltrating labor and building networks of radicals. Moreover, in July 1918, the US sent 
troops to participate in an Allied intervention in Russia, causing Americans to act against 
Bolsheviks as a wartime enemy. Given these events, 1919 did not mark the beginning of 
the First Red Scare, but rather came as a culmination of precedents against Bolshevism that 
had already been set in American society in the past year. However, while 1919 did not 
mark the start of the First Red Scare, American fear of Bolshevism did intensify throughout 
the country, as labor strikes became more prevalent, radicals carried out bombings, and 
government persecution of radicals increased. Additionally, stories concerning the 
intervention of US and Allied troops in Russia persisted in American newspapers during 
1919 and 1920. Press coverage of the intervention should be considered another factor of 
the First Red Scare because it led Americans to view the Bolsheviks as enemies both at 
home and abroad.  
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To better understand the events of 1919, however, it is necessary to look back to 
the Progressive Era of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries when an organized labor 
movement took place aiming to accomplish better conditions for American workers.309 The 
American Federation of Labor became an important group during this time, led by its 
president, Samuel Gompers. By 1897, the group held two-million workers from over one-
hundred unions in its ranks.310 The AFL and groups like it often chose to either work within 
the economic system or utilize strikes to achieve their goals. Ultimately, this culminated in 
legislation which achieved better benefits for unions and workers, such as expanding the 
right to strike and regulated work days and pay. 311 However, the Progressive Era came to 
a close with America’s involvement in World War I.312 In attempts to keep war production 
flowing smoothly, labor made an agreement with the US government to halt labor 
strikes.313 In turn, the government decided to cooperate with non-radical unions in an effort 
to preserve workers’ rights and living standards achieved during the Progressive Era, and 
even went as far as to enter a partnership with the AFL so that the labor organization could 
help establish these conditions during the war. Gompers saw this new partnership as an 
avenue to gain further benefits for labor, and the AFL and the US government cooperated 
well throughout the war.314   
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However, the AFL and the government’s wartime relationship came to a close as 
the war ended, resulting in the loss of government support for workers.315 Furthermore, 
inflation swept through the country and lowered the purchasing power of the dollar, making 
it difficult for the average worker to afford the necessities of life.316 This problem 
intensified even more with the demobilization of America’s total war economy, as the 
9,000,000 war-industry workers and the 4,000,000 armed servicemen began to face 
unemployment.317 This economic unrest led to unions calling for better wages and hours 
for workers and reignited a drive for reforms like those of the Progressive Era. Instead, 
labor met a strong anti-union sentiment from industrialists and employers across the 
country who decided to stand against collective bargaining, which led to an estimated 3,600 
organized labor strikes throughout 1919 alone.318 During late 1917 and 1918, Americans 
already began to fear that labor might become a vehicle for the Bolsheviks to carry out a 
Marxist revolution in the US. The presence of radical labor groups that Americans already 
viewed as Bolshevik supporters, such as the IWW and the Socialist Party, in the strikes of 
1919 only affirmed to Americans that labor had been infiltrated by Bolshevik radicalism. 
With these circumstances in play, the hysteric reactions to Bolshevism that had emerged 
in American society over the year prior intensified.  
 Of the thousands of strikes in 1919, Seattle saw one of the earliest.319 On January 
21, 1919, over 35,000 shipyard workers went on strike to advocate for higher wages and 
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shorter work days.320 The Seattle Central Labor Council, a non-radical representative of 
organized labor within the region, attempted to assist the shipyard employees by organizing 
a general strike for February 6 and calling for all of Seattle’s organized laborers to go on 
strike. If successful, the general strike held the potential to shut the entire city down for its 
duration. When hearing of these plans, the American press over-exaggerated the council’s 
aim, making it seem like the first step to a Red revolution.321 Days before the strike, the 
Oregon Journal declared that radicals controlled the organized labor movement in Seattle, 
claiming that a poison of Bolshevik “illusions and frenzy” manifested within the city’s 
workers.322 The Seattle Star begged workers to avoid use of the general strike because “this 
is America, not Russia.”323 Newspapers such as these predicted the worst for the city. As 
planned, the general strike in Seattle commenced on February 6, with over 60,000 laborers 
protesting; only 3,500 of whom held membership with the IWW.324 The strike also 
remained non-violent, but still the media portrayed the event as an attack from the 
Bolsheviks with such headlines as “Reds Directing Seattle Strike-To Test Chance for 
Revolution” and “Belief Grows That Strike is Start of Bolshevik Revolt.”325 
Pennsylvania’s Warren Times Mirror told its readers of the paralysis of Seattle, caused no 
doubt by the Bolsheviks using the city as the starting point of a revolution in America.326 
Feeling threatened by the idea of a Bolshevik takeover, Seattle’s Mayor, Ole Hanson, 
swore in an extra 1,000 police officers and personally led 800 federal troops into the city 
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in his American flag-draped car.327 He gave the order to these men to kill on sight anyone 
attempting to break the law or start a riot.328 Hanson’s summoning of police and troops to 
end a suspected Bolshevik resembled the tactic used on November 24, 1918 by Minnesota 
Governor Joseph A. A. Burnquist, who mobilized police and National Guard soldiers to 
suppress a gathering of socialists in Minneapolis.329  
The commotion of the media and Mayor Hanson’s action promoted the public’s 
hostility to the strike. Fearing that this hostility could harm aspirations of organized labor 
across the nation, the AFL called for the demonstration to conclude. The AFL’s pressure 
ended the strike on February 10, but Mayor Hanson took its closing to be a result of his 
summoning extra forces.330 He believed he stopped the revolution and prevented a 
duplication of Petrograd from happening in Seattle.331 The press obliged him, producing 
headlines such as “Mayor Hits Bolsheviki of Seattle” and “Seattle’s Mayor a Champion of 
Order.”332 Becoming a national hero, Hanson left Seattle the day after the strike subsided 
to go on a cross-country speaking tour to “warn the nation of the Bolshevik threat.”333 Also, 
he authored a book titled Americanism versus Bolshevism, in which he told of his 
experience of putting down the Bolsheviks in Seattle and the differences between 
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Americanism and Bolshevism, only further fueling confusion and anxiety across the 
country.334  
 Around the time of the events in Seattle, the federal government prepared to further 
investigate the threat of Bolshevism. On February 4, a senatorial sub-committee, known as 
the Overman Committee, purposed to investigate pro-German propaganda during World 
War I, found itself repurposed for “an investigation of Bolshevism and all other anti-
American radicalism in the United States” and to “inquire concerning any party exercising 
or claiming to exercise authority in Russia.”335 The committee’s switch of focus from 
Germany to Russia showed that the US now considered Bolshevism to be America’s largest 
threat. The investigation began February 11, and the sub-committee heard testimonies of 
Americans who had traveled to Russia and witnessed Bolshevism first-hand.336 The New 
York Times reported one man told Senators about “mass terror by Bolsheviki,” and the 
“Reds’ hatred of Americans.”337 Out of two dozen testimonies heard over the following 
month, a third expressed anti-Bolshevik sentiment.338 As the Overman Committee’s 
investigation ended on March 10, it expressed several findings. It first claimed the Socialist 
Party of America, IWW, and Bolsheviks to be working together to stage a revolution in 
America, as evidenced by all three groups’ history of using a red flag, thus putting the 
country at risk. Also, the committee members felt union members and labor organizers to 
be most vulnerable to Bolshevik propaganda, with up to 8,000 unions potentially being 
                                                          
334 Hanson, Americanism versus Bolshevism, 84-96, 281-299. 
335 New York Times, February 4, 1919; Bolshevik Propaganda: Hearings before a Subcommittee of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Res. 439 and 469, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., February 11, 1919, to March 
10, 1919 
336 Hagedorn, Hope and Fear, 88. 
337 New York Times, February 11, 1919.  
338 Hagedorn, Hope and Fear, 147.  
73 
 
influenced.339 The committee suggested that to fix this, the country needed new laws 
restricting the activities of aliens and radicals, more censorship, and a continued military 
presence in Russia.340 As the New York Times reported the committee’s findings with 
“extremists here plan[ning] a revolt to seize power,” the Overman Committee helped 
further hysteria throughout America by giving Congressional validation to fears that 
developed throughout 1917 and 1918 that Bolsheviks would attempt to use American 
workers to overthrow the government.341  
 Meanwhile, throughout the early months of 1919, the press published stories about 
American troops in Russia and the Allied Intervention. Often, news articles covered 
combat between American and Bolshevik forces. On January 1, the Los Angeles Times 
printed a story about an American patrol of seventeen men being led on a mission by a 
Serbian in North Russia to raid Bolshevik outposts. According to the report, the Americans 
exchanged gunfire with Red Army machine gunners, killing seven Red soldiers, while the 
Americans took no casualties.342 Another article told of how soldiers from Michigan and 
Wisconsin managed to capture a dozen villages from Bolshevik control.343 The Wichita 
Beacon reported news of combat between Bolshevik and American forces. In separate 
instances, Red Army troops shelled American troops at both Ust Padenga and the Vologda 
railway. The same article included information on an American plane bombing key 
Bolshevik positions.344 Some papers covered stories from the perspectives of individual 
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American soldiers. One newspaper featured a report from Colonel George F. Steward, a 
commanding officer of American soldiers in north Russia, who claimed that the American 
troops stationed in Russia were holding strong “against the whole of the Bolshevist 
army.”345 In another story, the El Paso Herald published a piece about Roy Mitchell, the 
only Texan serving with the American forces in Archangel. According to Mitchell, the US 
soldiers endured numerous “hardships while engaged in holding back the Bolshevik 
forces.”346 Overall, news about Bolshevik and US forces fighting certainly aided in 
Americans perceiving the Bolsheviks as not only terrorists and spies, but also as military 
enemies.  
Some articles portrayed Allied troops as a saving force that would liberate Russia 
from the disorder of the Bolsheviks. The Grand Forks Herald of North Dakota ran an 
article titled “Withdrawal of Troops in Russia would be Calamity Says Dunham.” In the 
article, Canadian Captain W.E. Dunham claimed that Bolshevik rule had brought 
“complete chaos” throughout Siberia, but that Allied troops had restored “order” and 
“safety” in “life, property and travel.”347 As the headline of the story read, Dunham also 
believed that Allied troops were the only force keeping Bolshevism from overrunning 
Siberia, and that to withdraw those soldiers would be a grave mistake.348 The Daily Times 
printed a picture entitled “U.S. Guards Feed ‘Red’ Prisoners.”349 In the picture, an 
American soldier at Archangel served food to Bolsheviki soldiers taken prisoner by the 
Allied forces. Underneath the image, a caption read “The Bolsheviki, fighting against the 
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U.S. troops and every other agency representing law and order in Russia, are glad to accept 
wholesome food when taken prisoner by allied troops.”350 Articles like those published in 
the Grand Forks Herald and the Daily Times presented Allied and American troops as 
defenders of stability to American readers, while also describing Bolsheviks as bringers of 
lawlessness and disorder. In short, these stories portrayed Bolshevism as the total opposite 
of the Americanism. 
On April 12, it seemed that the Bolshevik propaganda Americans feared at home 
infected the ranks of American soldiers stationed in Russia, troops in Archangel mutinied 
and refused to the frontlines. American officials blamed Bolshevik leaflets discovered 
among the soldiers for the mutiny, and the press carried news of this event. A headline in 
the Concord Daily Tribune read “Bolsheviki Fooled Yanks into Mutiny.”351 Other 
newspapers carried a variation of the same story with headlines reading “Blames Mutiny 
on Bolsheviki,” “Red Propaganda Cause of Mutiny in Archangel,” and “Shows Bol 
Propaganda was Cause of Mutiny Among the U.S. Troops.”352 Each of the articles also 
blamed the source of the leaflets on one person among the soldiers, saying that most of the 
troops would change their behavior and perspective on their mutinous actions once they 
discovered how Americans back home disapproved of their Bolsheviki-influenced 
actions.353 The New York Tribune offered a different perspective in its coverage, however. 
Instead of blaming Bolshevik propaganda for the mutiny, the paper said that the troops 
disobeyed orders because they felt “the war with Germany was over and that the United 
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States was not at war with the Bolsheviki.”354 In answering whether the US and the 
Bolsheviks were at war, the New York Tribune claimed that although the US disapproved 
of Bolshevism and felt that their leaders were “monsters,” the paper did not know if anyone 
could say accurately that the US was at war with the Bolsheviki.355 According to the paper, 
there was little evidence the US was at war with the Bolsheviki morally, politically, or 
economically. Overall, the paper sympathized with the troops and stated the US 
government sent them to Russia “with no rational purpose in view.”356 While the New York 
Tribune article shows that the press held differing perspectives on the causes of the mutiny, 
the claim that Bolsheviki propaganda inspired the insubordination of US soldiers in Russia 
held strong in newspapers throughout the country. These articles show that fear emerged 
that the Bolsheviks conspired to not only use Americans for revolt, but also American 
soldiers overseas. 
On the home front, violent actions on April 28 seemed to confirm suspicions of a 
radical uprising, as an explosive package arrived at Mayor Hanson’s house. The bomb did 
not explode though, because Hanson did not open the package. On April 29, however, a 
bomb sent to Senator Thomas Hardwick’s home in Atlanta, Georgia detonated, maiming 
Hardwick’s maid.357 Over the next few days, mail employees discovered thirty-four more 
explosive packages addressed to targets such as Senator Lee Overman, Attorney General 
A. Mitchell Palmer, J.P. Morgan, and John D. Rockefeller. Worse, no suspects could be 
found.358 The American press jumped to conclusions. The New York Times pinned the 
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bombings on Bolsheviks, anarchists, and IWW members.359 Additionally, the Harrisburg 
Telegraph ran the headline “Trying to Track Reds Responsible for Bomb Plots,” and 
claimed the failed assassinations meant to spark a nationwide revolution on May Day, a 
holiday celebrated by labor organizations.360 Some doubted the media, questioning how a 
progressive and labor supporter like Senator Hardwick fit into the “radical” inspired 
assassination plot, and yet higher priority targets were left out.361 Despite the confusion, 
radical labor groups celebrating May Day felt the wrath of society following the April 
bomb plot. 
May Day, an American labor holiday observed by workers across the nation since 
1890, drew out “socialists, anarchists, labor leaders, and union workers” to participate in 
parades and other festivities.362 As American radical groups paraded under red flags on 
May 1, 1919, riots broke out in major cities across the nation; as both police and civilians 
used force against the participants.363 A group of socialists in Boston found themselves in 
trouble for holding a red flag parade without a permit. When confronted by police, the 
group refused to stop, which led to a conflict that left four participants wounded and one 
police officer killed, as well as a mob attack on the Boston socialist headquarters.364 In 
New York City, police and soldiers beat socialist participants with clubs, arrested them, 
and forced them to sing the National Anthem. These men also confiscated a number of 
pamphlets and literature from the Russian Workers’ House in the city.365 Newspapers in 
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Chicago reported that a combination of rain and police stopped socialists from succeeding 
in a Red revolution.366 Cleveland saw the worst of the day’s events, as soldiers and police 
used guns, clubs, and tanks to stop red flag parades from occurring in the city. Police 
arrested over 100 people in Cleveland, and gunfire injured several victims.367 Police and 
vigilantes wrecked the socialist headquarters in Cleveland as well.368 The precedent for 
using mob violence against leftists for their supposed connections to Bolshevism had 
already been set in November 1918, when soldiers and sailors stationed in New York City 
attacked socialists at socialist meetings. During these episodes, police had attempted to 
protect the socialists from the large crowds of troops.369 However, the violence leftists 
endured in 1919 developed as an escalation in American society’s fear of Bolshevism as 
police attacked leftist demonstrators and civilians participated in these acts of violence as 
well. Additionally, violence against participants marked the first-time that suppression of 
leftists occurred simultaneously in numerous cities across the US. While fear of and 
opposition to suspected Bolshevik supporters had existed in America since November 
1917, anti-Bolshevism reached a new level in May 1919.370  
On June 2, fear of Bolsheviks became further reinforced as bombs exploded in eight 
cities.371 While all caused terror, the bombing of Attorney General Palmer’s house in 
Washington D.C. became the most significant. The bomb exploded in the middle of the 
night, strangely killing the bomber and leaving the Palmer family unscathed. However, the 
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explosion destroyed Palmer’s house, leaving debris, human remains, and “Red literature” 
all over the lawn.372 These flyers, which called for class warfare, were signed “the 
Anarchist Fighters.”373 While this seemed to be a revolutionary act, all evidence pointed to 
the bomber being Luigi Calisieri, a member of Luigi Galleani’s anarchist group, the 
Galleanists, a group with only held 50 to 60 members, not nearly enough to overthrow the 
government.  Calisieri more than likely carried out this bombing out retaliation for the 
deportation of Galleani scheduled later in the month.374 Still, newspapers across the country 
blamed the bombing on the Bolsheviks and anyone under the “red banner” such as IWW 
members, German sympathizers, and anarchists.375 Palmer agreed.376 Around this time, 
propaganda posters and political cartoons consistently portrayed radicals as anarchists and 
foreign extremists with unkempt hair, who carried bombs and red flags in their unwitting 
and failing attempts to defeat America.377 Cartoons likewise depicted leftists as dangerous 
and disheveled revolutionaries as early as January 1918, and the anti-Bolshevik drawings 
of 1919 continued to show leftists as opposers of Americanism.  
On June 11, David Francis, the former American ambassador to Russia, spoke 
gravely of the situation in Russia in a speech he gave in Rye Beach, New Hampshire. 
Francis claimed that Russia, under the unstable government of the Bolsheviks, could 
potentially fall victim to Germany and German influence. If this happened, Francis feared 
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that Germany would use Russia’s significant resources to become powerful enough to once 
again terrorize Europe.378 Newspapers throughout the US carried his speech, causing 
events in Russia to continue to fuel the hysteria of the First Red Scare at home. The 
Muskogee Times-Democrat published Francis’ speech under the headline “Francis Warns 
of Hun Designs if Reds are not Quieted Soon: Germany Will Mobilize Immense Man 
Power and Use Helpless Nation for Own Ends if Bolsheviki are not Defeated.”379 Other 
papers ran headlines such as “Francis Warns of Peril from Russia,” Ambassador Francis 
Believes Germany may be Menace in Russia,” and “If Russia Falls Prey to Germany, 
Danger may be Great.”380 Francis’ speech and the news coverage of it show that panic over 
the Bolsheviks still could be traced to World War I and the initial fear that the Bolsheviks 
were German agents. 
Persecution of leftists continued in June when the Lusk Committee, a group created 
by the New York State Legislature in early 1919 to investigate seditious acts and prevent 
a Bolshevik revolution, decided to start its investigations one month earlier than planned.381 
Led by Senator Clayton R. Lusk, the committee sent police on June 12 to raid New York 
City’s Russian-Soviet Bureau, an entity the committee feared aimed to incite a 
revolution.382 Police arrested everyone who worked there and confiscated all forms of 
literature within the building.383 Using this material, the committee claimed they possessed 
evidence that Bolsheviks and other radical groups were plotting revolutionary acts.384 On 
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June 21, the committee led raids on the city’s IWW Headquarters, the Left Wing Socialist 
Headquarters, and the Rand School of Social Science, a socialist college. Only the raid on 
the Rand School provided substantial evidence; papers which the committee claimed linked 
the school to the Russian Soviet Bureau in a plot for revolution.385 According to the 
Evening World, the committee found books authored by Lenin at the Rand School, leading 
to the committee to question whether people should be free to circulate what it deemed 
violent propaganda.386 The committee also claimed these organizations planned to 
radicalize “negroes” to help overthrow the government, and the committee opened a case 
to have the Rand School’s charter removed.387 Overall, the Lusk Committee’s actions 
continued a practice of using police raids and seizure of leftist documents as methods of 
suppressing suspected Bolshevik revolutionaries, which had begun as early as May 1918 
when police arrested Russian anarchists and confiscated thousands of copies of their 
monthly periodical. In comparison though, the Lusk Committee used raids to more 
extensively investigate leftists by targeting multiple groups and places at once.388 Yet, the 
Lusk Committee did not prove ultimately successful. By late July, it became clear that the 
committee did not actually possess evidence to back up its claims against the Rand School 
and the court declined to go through with proceedings against the institution.389  
Throughout the summer of 1919, press coverage of the Allied intervention 
continually reminded Americans of the US soldiers stationed in Russia. In early June, the 
US government withdrew the 1,600 American soldiers of the 339th infantry from the 
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Russian front to bring them home.390 When they returned, Detroit hosted the soldiers as 
guests and on July 4, held a parade for them.391 With thousands in attendance, the 339th 
infantry were treated as heroes for their service. The Detroit Free Press ran a headline that 
said “339th Attacked, Missiles are Flowers, Enemy, Pretty Girls” in describing a scene in 
which Red Cross Canteen workers “showered” the soldiers with flowers as they welcomed 
them into the city.392 Moreover, in the days leading up to the parade, the Detroit Free Press 
published stories about the bravery and valor of the 339th in their struggle against the 
Bolsheviks.393 Additionally, the press carried stories of the soldiers denying that Bolshevik 
propaganda tempted them to mutiny earlier in the year. The Detroit Free Press said an 
officer claimed it was “ridiculous even to suggest that Bolshevist propaganda” influenced 
US troops, while the Union County Journal of Marysville, Ohio quoted Major J. Brooks 
Nichols saying that “the men of the 339th are the best disciplined and most courageous of 
any outfit.”394 Overall, the return of the soldiers from the 339th infantry demonstrated that 
the American people viewed the soldiers serving in Russia as heroes, and the press depicted 
these troops as fighters against the Bolshevik menace. 
Furthermore, after a skirmish between Bolshevik and American forces on June 25 
at Romanovka, stories about the battle appeared in newspapers around the US. According 
to accounts, a group of 300 Bolsheviki ambushed the camp of Company A, 31st Infantry, 
which held 74 US troops purposed to guard the railways to Vladivostok. Early in the 
morning, while the Americans slept in their tents, the Red Army soldiers fired on them, 
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killing 19 US soldiers and injuring 27. Following the initial attack, American and 
Bolshevik forces engaged in a 3-hour battle, while the Americans awaited reinforcements. 
The papers likened the battle to that of the era of American westward expansion, saying 
that “for three hours, Americans fought as in an Indian battle of the frontier days.”395 Some 
papers even developed headlines based on this comparison. The Cincinnati Enquirer wrote 
“Indian Methods are Used by Bolsheviki during Attack on Yank Camp in Russia,” and 
inversely the San Francisco Examiner claimed “Yanks Fight Like Indians Against ‘Red 
Army’ in Siberia.396  
The articles did not end with the battle though, but also described a Bolshevik 
ambush that occurred the following day. According to the press, this time the US soldiers 
were prepared for the attack, with the Americans enduring two casualties, while the 
Bolsheviks lost 25 soldiers.397 Some newspapers ran the story of the two-day battle under 
headlines that depicted the Americans as the victors. The Journal Gazette from Mattoon, 
Illinois claimed “U.S. Men Hurl Back Red Attack,” while the New York Tribune wrote 
“Americans in Russia Avenge Reds’ Victory.”398 Some of the articles described the 
feelings of American soldiers after the conflict, writing that these troops felt intense hatred 
for the Bolsheviks and wanted to further avenge the Americans killed by them.399 The news 
coverage of the fighting in Romanovka showed readers in the US that American and 
Bolshevik forces were not neutral in their interactions, but fought as enemies. News articles 
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like these helps re-contextualize the First Red Scare as not only a hysteric reaction to the 
idea of Bolshevik revolution in the US, but also as a fear of a wartime enemy. 
The antics of the First Red Scare continued in late August and early September, 
when Communist parties formed for the first time in America. The Communist Labor party 
formed, containing 10,000 predominantly English-speaking members who pledged to “the 
organization of workers as a class, the overthrow of the capitalist rule and the conquest of 
political power by the workers.”400 Also, over 60,000 members formed the Communist 
Party of America, a group of primarily foreigners, who stated in their manifesto: “The 
Communist Party shall keep in the foreground its consistent appeal for proletarian 
revolution, the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat.”401 The creation of these parties drained both membership in the Socialist Party 
and the IWW, taking approximately 60,000 socialists and 2,000 IWW members. While this 
did prove support for Communism existed among both these groups, it also showed these 
groups maintained their identities; the Socialist Party continued to work legally through 
the existing political system to achieve its goals, while the IWW never fully committed 
itself to Communism.402 This went against the notion that these organizations together 
plotted a Bolshevik takeover. Furthermore, the membership of both communist parties only 
reached 70,000 in 1919, which “represented less than one tenth of one percent of the adult 
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population of the country.”403 Clearly, these two parties did not come close to possessing 
the power to stage a coup.  
Even though the two American communist parties made up an insignificant amount 
of the American population, hysteria only worsened in the country throughout the rest of 
September as labor strikes raged on. In Boston, the police force wanted better pay, hours, 
and working conditions and to unionize under the AFL (The AFL had just recently 
denounced Communism and refused recognition of Soviet Russia at its annual convention 
in June).404 However, the police met considerable opposition from both the city’s police 
commissioner and people, with some taking an anti-union stance, while others feared the 
police becoming puppets of radicals.405 Due to this, the police in Boston went on strike on 
September 9, and a Massachusetts newspaper claimed that “the city was abandoned 
virtually to the hoodlum and criminal” in a “night of terror” and “anarchy.”406 Looting 
occurred throughout the night, which did not bode well for public opinion of the strike or 
the police. As chaos ensued, Governor Calvin Coolidge and Mayor Andrew J. Peters 
summoned the volunteer police force and 5,000 State Guard troops to aid what little of the 
police force remained on the job to keep peace in the city.407 Riots occurred, resulting in 
the deaths of three people and a great amount of disorder erupting within Boston.408 In 
relation to the police strikes, Montana Senator Henry L. Meyers claimed “the nation will 
see a Soviet Government set up within two years’ time.”409 Many across the nation felt that 
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Bolshevik influence instigated the strike, and the police on strike became known as 
“deserters.”410 With the walk out continuing, Samuel Gompers urged the strikers to halt 
their activities and to see if mediation between the AFL and Massachusetts government 
could solve the problem. Gompers asked both the Governor and the Mayor to allow the 
strikers back to their jobs, but on September 13, they made the decision to fire all striking 
police officers and instead to recruit a new police force. Coolidge claimed “there is no right 
to strike against the public safety of anybody, anywhere, anytime,” ultimately bringing an 
end to the strike and earning himself national attention as a champion of order.411 Like in 
Seattle, organized labor failed yet again and continued to be accused of bolshevist 
affiliation.  
Demonstrations persisted throughout the month of September, when another 
significant strike occurred in the steel industry. In July 1919, the AFL wanted Elbert H. 
Gary, chairman of the United States Steel Corporation, to re-negotiate the rights of steel 
workers to include collective bargaining, regulated work hours, better wages, and days 
off.412 Gary refused, and on September 22, over 275,000 steel workers went on strike 
nationwide, and the number rose to 365,000 just four days later.413  Yet again, the America 
press connected these strikers’ efforts to Bolshevism. The New York Times claimed that it 
came as a shock that “organized labor was prepared to accept such a radical brand of state 
socialism,” and a clergyman wrote in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette that “the American 
Federation of Labor, however, seems to have fallen into the hands of the Bolsheviki and 
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the Reds.”414 Also, a propaganda cartoon depicted a giant arm waving a red flag over a 
steel mill, with the words “steel strike” displayed.415 On October 4, violent rioting broke 
out in Gary, Indiana, where steel companies attempted to use African American 
strikebreakers to try to stop a strike. This led to a conflict between the strikers and 
strikebreakers, and Governor James P. Goodrich ordered state militia to help end the 
chaos.416 Then, a bomb plot was discovered in Gary, and the press declared that the 
Bolshevik radicals in the country planned to use organized labor as a vehicle to overthrow 
the US government. Allegations emerged that those taken into custody for the bomb plot 
happened to be the makers of the bombs connected to both the April and June incidents, 
and, unfortunately, for the steel workers, authorities confiscated Communist party “hand 
bills” from these alleged plotters. 417 Steel workers denied association with this incident, 
but it was too late, as the strike became even more highly criticized. The movement lasted 
another two months, but the workers gained nothing in the process.418 
Within a month following this strike, Attorney General Palmer began raids to rid 
America of suspected radicals. He had prepared for an attack against them since June after 
the bombing of his home, when he asked for and received $500,000 from Congress in order 
for the Justice Department to apprehend “those who sought to destroy law and order.”419 
Then, in August, he created the anti-radical General Intelligence Division (GID) within the 
Bureau of Investigation, putting J. Edgar Hoover at the helm. Hoover created an index 
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system which contained a vast amount of information about suspected radical 
organizations, such as membership rosters, officers, and time and place of meetings.420  
Under Palmer and Hoover’s direction, the GID’s hunt for radicals became driven by 
xenophobia. The GID estimated that foreigners made up 90 percent of America’s radicals, 
and that neutralizing this percentage would put an end to the threat of revolt.421 Following 
the events of the fall, the GID decided to act on these suspicions.  
On November 7, the GID sent agents to raid the meeting halls of the Union of 
Russian Workers in twelve cities. They emptied out these halls, taking anything that 
appeared to be evidence, and they arrested thousands of the union’s Russian immigrant 
members.422 Then, on November 8, working with the Lusk Committee, the Justice 
Department raided over seventy radical meeting places and offices in New York and 
worked with other police departments to conduct raids across the country.423 Of all those 
arrested, 246 “were detained and considered deportable.”424 The New York Times cast 
Palmer as a hero who struck a significant blow to Bolshevik revolutionaries throughout the 
country, and said he “will deport Reds as alien plotters.”425 That is exactly what the Justice 
Department intended to do, when on December 21, it loaded approximately 249 alien 
radicals, most of whom did not even have a criminal record, onto the SS Buford for 
deportation. The Buford left New York for Hargo, Finland, where Palmer planned to send 
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the radicals to Russia by train. As the ship became known as “the Soviet Ark,” both the 
Justice Department and the public called for more deportations.426 
Palmer and the Justice Department next targeted the communist parties in America, 
and raided communist establishments and meetings in thirty-three cities across the country. 
On January 2, 1920, a “regular meeting night in all parts of the country” for Communists, 
authorities arrested over 4,000 members, and American citizens in these parties faced 
anarchist charges by their respective states, while the federal government planned to deport 
alien members.427 The press praised Palmer yet again, and other publications justified the 
actions against the communist parties as stopping revolution.428 The Washington Post 
claimed that preaching Bolshevism should not be protected under the First Amendment, 
and many Americans agreed, not caring if the rights of those arrested were being infringed 
upon.429 Additionally, Palmer endorsed a bill to make legal the deportation of both aliens 
and naturalized citizens for seditious acts.430 He also called for the deportations of 2,720 of 
those arrested in January with three more “Soviet Arks.”431 
However, these deportations needed to go through the Labor Department’s 
Assistant Secretary Louis F. Post, who made the final decisions. Believing that the Justice 
Department illegally obtained evidence and also refused those arrested the right to counsel, 
Post released almost half taken into custody in January. He also refused to categorize 
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Anarchists, IWW members, Socialists, and Communists together.432 This became the first 
in a series of events which started the decline of the First Red Scare. Post’s actions dealt a 
significant blow to the First Red Scare, but another would come in early 1920, when the 
New York Legislative Assembly kept five Socialists from taking the offices they had been 
elected to fill.433 The members of the assembly accused the Socialists of being supporters 
of Communism, and claimed that these Socialists thus would pose a threat to the country 
if they took office.434 The barring of these Socialists from participating in the assembly 
continued a precedent set during the war in which government members questioned 
allowing Socialists to take part in the government. However, in an unexpected turn of 
events, the press came out in support of the Socialists and covered this story extensively, 
causing it to garner national attention.435 The public reacted negatively to the government’s 
actions, arguing the assembly had violated their right to representative government. Due to 
this situation, many Americans came to realize that the hysteria of the First Red Scare had 
started to impede their own rights.436 Yet, despite the public uproar, the assembly never 
allowed the Socialists to take office.437  
Throughout the winter of 1919 to 1920, the press seemed to change its tone about 
the intervention as well. In December 1919, newspapers across the US carried an article 
written by Frank H. Simonds that argued that the Allies had been defeated in Russia. 
Simonds reasoned that no Russian army could overpower the Bolshevik military, and that 
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as border states made peace with the Bolsheviks, the Allies would lose the ability to access 
Russia. Ultimately, Simonds blamed the Allies for the survival of the Bolshevik regime, 
accusing the US, Britain, and France, among others, of failing to rid the world of the 
Bolshevik menace because these countries were unwilling to make further necessary 
sacrifices following World War I.438 This negative coverage of the Allied Intervention 
continued into January 1920, when the press released an article on former Secretary of 
State Elihu Root’s views on the Russian situation. Root claimed that “U.S. Promises to 
Russia were but Words” and that “the American people” were “in default to Russia.”439 
Root believed that the US failed in its friendship to the Russian people because the country 
did so little to stop the Bolsheviks from gaining control. He criticized the raids of the First 
Red Scare, stating that arresting a handful of Bolshevik agents and deporting them would 
never be enough to stop the flow of Bolshevism into the US. Instead, Root argued that 
Russia was the battleground on which to overthrow the Bolsheviks and that the Russians 
would gladly fight against their Bolshevik oppressors if the US provided “munitions of 
war, shoes and clothing and money” to the anti-Bolshevik forces.440 Despite Root’s plea, 
in March and April 1920, the US ended its participation in the intervention in Russia once 
the evacuation of the remaining Czech fighters began.441 As the US government began 
evacuating soldiers, the press reported on the operation with little flare. Papers did not 
frame the intervention as a battle between Americans and Bolsheviks. Rather, the press 
simply reported that after a year and a half, the US planned to remove all American soldiers 
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from Russia by April 1, 1920.442 As panic about the Bolshevik threat at home began to 
decline and the Bolsheviks began stabilizing their hold on Russia, the American press 
seemingly became less concerned with stories about the Bolshevik enemy abroad.  
As the First Red Scare continued to wane, Palmer persisted in trying to convince 
the nation of the threat of a Bolshevik overthrow. He still feared homegrown radicalism, 
and he attempted to keep fear alive to stay relevant as he aspired to win the presidency in 
the upcoming 1920 election.443 Furthermore, Palmer claimed he exposed a plot designed 
by radicals to take over the government on May Day, stating that the entire nation needed 
to be aware and on alert.444 The entire nation panicked, resulting in cities all across the 
country keeping large numbers of police active for the day, calling up bomb squads, and 
ensuring that federal officials were protected. In some cases, like in Chicago, authorities 
locked up suspected radicals for the day.445 However, May 1 quietly came and went, 
without a disturbance. The Decatur Herald ran a headline stating “May-Day Red ‘Plots’ A 
Fizzle” and the New York Times claimed “Peaceful Celebrations All over the Country As 
Result of Precautions by the Government.” 446 Whatever the cause, the calmness of the day 
showed the public that the Red threat really posed no threat at all.  
Conclusion 
 Toward the end of 1920, two events proved that the fear of radicals in American 
society during the First Red Scare subsided. The first being the Wall Street Bombing in 
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September, when a bomb exploded outside of the Wall Street building in New York City 
intending to kill banker J.P. Morgan. The explosion killed twenty-nine, but missed its 
target.447 Again, Palmer tried to stir fear by claiming the bombing as a Bolshevik plot, but 
the public did not buy into it. A symbol of capitalism itself had been attacked, and yet the 
American people finally realized that such plots did not have the support to be 
successful.448 The Presidential Election of 1920 became another event which brought an 
end to the frenzy. Americans took their focus off of radical plots to focus on choosing a 
new president. Besides Palmer, the other candidates steered away from claims of radical 
overthrow in their campaign platforms as they seemed unpopular with voters. Palmer’s 
insistence on these claims did not bode well for his presidential chances and, indeed, he 
failed to win his party’s nomination.449 These two events showed that fear of radical 
takeover no longer captivated the American public.  
Still, the persecution leftists faced in the US from 1917 to 1920 severely damaged 
the far left in America for the following decade.450 Even when communists began to gain 
strength again in the 1930s during the Great Depression, the Communist Party USA 
continued to struggle to gain members because of the stigma that had become associated 
with being a communist in American society. 451 Regarding the Allied Intervention in 
Russia, since the US managed to help the Czech Legion escape, the mission proved 
successful in that regard. However, for years following the intervention, the US faced the 
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accusation that it had interfered within Russia’s domestic affairs and attempted to weaken 
the Bolshevik government. Indeed, the intervention only hurt US and Soviet relations.452  
Overall, the First Red Scare of 1917 to 1920 profoundly influenced American life, 
diplomacy, and politics during the Scare itself and in the century that followed. By 
expanding the First Red Scare to include the years 1917 and 1918, as well as the Allied 
Intervention, historians can better contextualize and understand Americans’ first 
perceptions and interactions with Bolshevism. The animosity that emerged between the US 
and communists during World War I intensified after WWII, and developed into the Cold 
War in the latter half of the twentieth century. As early as late 1917, Americans viewed 
communists and communism as an infectious threat to democratic society. Through 1918 
to 1920, this perception of communism in America only strengthened, as Americans came 
to see the Bolsheviks as wartime enemies through Russia’s withdrawal from the war and 
the Allied Intervention and as revolutionary spies lurking behind American labor and 
leftists. Even though the hysteria surrounding the fear of a Bolshevik revolution in America 
weakened significantly by the end of 1920, it would be the image of the Bolsheviki that 
Americans developed in the First Red Scare that they would use to contrast with American 
capitalism and democracy in the decades that followed. 
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